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COMMENTS
A Jurisprudence of Doubt: Generalized Grievances as a
Limitation to Federal Court Access
Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.'
I. INTRODUCTION
It is difficult to conceive of a constitutional doctrine more riddled
with confusion, more unanimously savaged by commentator and
court, more important and yet more neglected than the access doc-
trines which encompass standing jurisprudence. Favorable commen-
tary regarding the federal concept of standing is elusive, and those
looking beyond commentary and seeking some coherent understand-
ing may find the doctrine as perplexing as the sphinx's riddle. As a
result, it is not surprising that virtually every article attempting to ex-
plain or criticize the recent explosion in standing jurisprudence begins
with obligatory footnotes citing both scholars'2 and the Supreme
Court's own criticism of standing.'
The confusion surrounding standing jurisprudence does not di-
minish the central importance it has in federal court litigation.4 At its
core, standing is access, and "access decisions influence in a major way
our constitutional structure."5 In public law areas, such as environ-
mental protection, standing can mean the difference between court
1. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992) (joint opinion of Jus-
tices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter).
2. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Forward: Public Law Liti-
gation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REv. 4, 22-23 (1982) (arguing that standing
amounts to a "ritual recitation" before the court "chooses up sides and decides the case");
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L. J. 221, 290 (1988) ("[T]he
Supreme Court has failed to articulate an intellectual framework that can satisfactorily
explain the results in cases that are already decided, or that can be usefully employed to
shape legal analysis in cases yet to come."); Gene R. Nichol, Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL
L. REv. 68, 68 (1984) ("In perhaps no other area of constitutional law has scholarly com-
mentary been so uniformly critical.").
3. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,475 (1982) ("We need not mince words when we say
that the concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined with complete consistency in all
of the various cases decided by this Court.").
4. See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976) ("No princi-
ple is more fundamental to the judiciary's proper role in our system of government than
the constitutional limitations of federal-court jurisdiction to actual cases or
controversies.").
5. Nichol, supra note 2, at 69.
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action and the status quo.6  Although the importance of standing is
most easily seen in public law areas, 7 where courts are asked to en-
force rights against the government, standing issues are not limited to
such situations.8 Moreover, unfamiliarity with standing jurisprudence
inflicts costly and inefficient litigation expenditures. Litigators unfa-
miliar with the law of standing may win at trial or even at the appel-
late level only to find that a higher court refuses to hear the merits.
Similarly, defense attorneys unfamiliar with standing may waste signif-
icant resources or lose a case on the merits when a standing motion
early in the litigation would have best served their clients' interests.
Generalized grievances are a subcomponent of standing doctrine
and encompass a set of doctrinal limitations on federal court access.
These limitations preclude plaintiffs from asserting a generalized in-
jury, often said to be suffered "by all or a large class of citizens."9
Generalized grievances endure all the difficulties of general standing
jurisprudence but less of the critical commentary.' 0 This dearth in
commentary may be due, in part, to the limited number of Supreme
Court cases discussing generalized grievances." Yet in recent years
6. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992) (denying stand-
ing to environmental plaintiffs challenging federal environmental regulations) with Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 81 (1978) (finding standing for
environmental group challenging liability limitations for nuclear accidents).
7. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563 (denying standing to environmental group who
challenged validity of federal environmental regulations); Valley Forge Christian College,
454 U.S. at 470 (holding that public interest group did not have standing to challenge on
Establishment Clause grounds the transfer of federal property to a religious school of
higher education); Duke Power Co. 438 U.S. at 81 (finding that individuals who live near a
nuclear power plant have standing to challenge federal limitations on liability for nuclear
accidents). For a discussion of public law litigation, see Chayes, supra note 2, at 4-5.
8. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 166 (1990) (denying standing to a
death row inmate challenging state court's denial of a mandatory appellate review for a
fellow death row inmate); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AmERICAN CONSTITUIONAL LAW
107 (2d ed. 1988) ("Standing questions arise principally in challenges to government con-
duct, where litigants often lack the obvious stake present in most lawsuits between private
parties .... ). For a detailed analysis and overview of a nonpublic law application of
standing, see Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387
(1995) (outlining and developing a synthesis for standing of state governments in federal
court).
9. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
10. Throughout this Comment reference will be made to generalized grievances both
as a standing limitation and as a descriptive term of art. When a claim or category of cases
is described as generalized it is implicitly a claim which fails to meet the standing require-
ments because it falls under generalized grievance limitations.
11. Explicit reference to generalized grievance has occurred seventeen times in the
Court's history. See United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995); Lujan, 504 U.S. at
575; Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 177 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Asarco Inc. v. Kadish, 490
U.S. 605, 616 (1989); Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,
449 (1989); County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226,269 (1985)
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generalized grievances have taken on a new and important role. Of
the seventeen references to generalized grievances in the Court's his-
tory, almost half have come after 1980.12 More importantly, the con-
cept of generalized grievances has been used to limit court access in
such hotly contested areas as environmental litigation, 13 racial equal-
ity,14 and First Amendment Establishment Clause jurisprudence.15
The continued vitality of this access limitation was recently reaf-
firmed in United States v. Hays'6 and continues to play an important
role in civil litigation, particularly where public interest groups seek to
enforce group-based rights against the government. Moreover, as this
Comment will attempt to demonstrate, generalized grievances often
have the effect of rendering constitutional provisions beyond the
scope of judicial review. 7 Such an effect is significant because it
leaves both constitutional interpretation and enforcement in executive
and legislative hands, a result which is unique to generalized griev-
ances. Generalized grievances are emblematic of the Court's new
found willingness to defer to the other branches of government in con-
stitutional interpretation and enforcement.
Part II of this Comment outlines the Supreme Court's basic
standing analysis, including the "constitutional minimum"' 8 of in-
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Secretary of State v.
Joseph H. Monson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956 n.5 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College, 454
U.S. at 475; Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 120 (1979) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 80; Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,264 (1977); Warth, 422 U.S. at 499; Schlesinger v.
Reservist Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974); United States v. Richardson,
418 U.S. 166, 175-76 (1974); Association of Data Processing, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 159,
171 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106
(1968). Search of WESTLAW, SCT database (Oct. 30, 1995).
12. See supra note 11 (listing the cases in reverse chronological order).
13. See infra notes 122-33 and accompanying text (discussing Lujan and the impact the
Court's generalized grievance rationale has on environmental standing); see also Randall S.
Abate & Michael J. Meyers, Broadening the Scope of Environmental Standing: Procedural
and Informational Injury in Fact after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 12 UCLA J. ENVT.
L. & PoL'Y 345 (1994) (discussing alternative standing rationales after the Supreme
Court's landmark environmental standing decision in Lujan); Roger Beers, Standing and
Related Procedural Hurdles in Environmental Litigation, C127 ALI-ABA 1 (1995) (discuss-
ing the maze of standing requirements which must be overcome in order to gain represen-
tational and individual standing in environmental litigation).
14. See Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2431 (voting rights); Allen, 468 U.S. at 737 (racial
segregation).
15. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 464; Flast, 392 U.S. at 83; see also Marc Rohr, Tilting
at Crosses: Nontaxpayer Standing to Sue Under the Establishment Clause, 11 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 495, 495-503 (1995) (discussing standing and the Establishment Clause).
16. 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
17. See infra notes 182-91 and accompanying text.
18. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
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jury,19 causation,20 and redressability.21 Over the past two decades
these components, rooted in Article III of the Constitution, have be-
come increasingly important and are now an indispensable require-
ment of federal court access. 22 In addition, this section will identify
two prudential limitations which, while not constitutionally required,
still constitute self-imposed restraints on the authority of the judiciary
to hear cases and render opinions.23
Part III introduces what has traditionally been considered a third
prudential limitation and thus a bar to federal court access-genera-
lized grievances. This section analyzes the Supreme Court's conflict-
ing treatment of generalized grievances. Emphasis is placed on the
1992 decision Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,24 which several commen-
tators believe has removed generalized grievances from a prudential
limitation and placed it in the realm of a constitutional requirement.25
This section concludes by surveying federal circuit court cases after
Lujan in order to ascertain its effect in the lower courts.26
Part IV surveys the Supreme Court's generalized grievance cases
in an effort to define, explain, and critique this obstacle to federal
court access.27 As a corollary to this process, an attempt will be made
to clarify the confusion surrounding the prudential/constitutional dis-
tinction as outlined in Part III. This analysis divides the Supreme
Court's treatment of generalized grievances into five discrete fact pat-
terns or theories. These include: (1) generalized grievances as an in-
jury suffered by a large group; (2) generalized grievances pertaining to
a constitutional form of governmental process; (3) racial stigmatiza-
tion as a generalized grievance; (4) generalized grievances as part of
the particularity requirement of Article III; and (5) generalized griev-
ances as a form of judicial restraint. This section ultimately concludes
that, as traditionally defined, generalized grievances have always been
a constitutional limitation rooted in Article III. Furthermore, as pru-
dentially understood, generalized grievances are merely reformula-
tions of either the political questions doctrine or the judicial
philosophy of self-restraint. As a result, this Comment advocates an
19. See infra notes 56-76 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
22. Since 1945 standing has been mentioned in terms of Article 1111,975 times in the
federal courts. Search of WESTLAW, Allfeds database (November 10, 1995).
23. See infra notes 91-108 and accompanying text.
24. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
25. See infra notes 109-40 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between
judicially created prudential limitations and Art. III constitutional requirements).
26. See infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 151-311 and accompanying text.
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abandonment of generalized grievances as prudentially defined and a
reformulation of generalized grievances which more closely resembles
the traditional Article III requirement of particularized injury.
II. STANDING OVERVIEW
There are three basic constitutional requirements of standing-
injury, causation and redressability. Simply stated they require: (1) an
injury-in-fact, by which the Court means "a legally protected interest
that is [both] 'concrete and particularized and actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical' ,,;28 (2) "a causal relationship between the
injury and the challenged conduct" 29 such that the injury can be
"fairly traced to the challenged action of the defendant"; 30 and (3) "a
likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.
' 31
Despite their relative clarity, these requirements hide many of the
complexities and pitfalls of standing litigation.3 2
The constitutional foundation of these requirements is theoreti-
cally rooted in Article III, which requires federal courts to adjudicate
only "Cases" 33 or "Controversies." 34 Upon this foundation, a party
who lacks a redressable injury caused by the defendant fails to bring
forth a "case or controversy." As such, the court lacks jurisdiction to
hear the case and must dismiss the action. 5
28. Northeastern Fla. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2302 (1993)
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)) (emphasis added; cita-
tions, footnote and internal quotations omitted).
29. Id. (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976))
30. Simon, 426 U.S. at 41.
31. Id.
32. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 107. ("Although the Supreme Court's view of standing has
evolved considerably over recent years and currently presents substantial confusion at a
number of points, the doctrinal categories that must be examined are clear.").
33. U.S. CoNsT. art. III § 2.
34. Id. Not all commentators agree that standing is required by Article III. Most have
argued that standing cannot be historically justified. Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINIsTRATiVE ACTION 462-67 (1965) (arguing that injury is not a prerequisite to
judicial standing); Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional
Right?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 passim (1969) (exploring the Framers perceptions of Article III
and the Court's power); Cass Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "In-
juries" and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 168-79 (1992) (same); Steven L. Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1371 (1988)
(same); see also Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia, Standing and Public Law Litigation, 42
DUKE L.J. 1141, 1150 (1993) (noting the Framers' lack of substantive discussion regarding
the requirement of case or controversy).
35. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing sufficient facts in the pleadings to
meet standing requirements. United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995) ("[I]t is
the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor, clearly to allege
facts demonstrating that he is the proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dis-
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In determining whether standing conditions are met, the Court
focuses on the party bringing suit, not on the merits of the party's
claim.36 The central issue is whether this party can sue. As Justice
Scalia has wryly noted, the question is "what's it to you."'37 This view
of standing, as unrelated to the merits, has been criticized not only for
being less than sincere, but also for developing an analysis of standing
unrelated to the cause of action.38 Nevertheless, an emphasis on the
party rather than the cause of action is undoubtedly the black letter
law in standing jurisprudence.
A. Justification for Standing
Whatever its constitutional basis, one thing is clear: Standing is a
modern development of constitutional law that has exploded over the
last quarter century.39 The first reference to standing did not occur
until 1944 in Stark v. Wickard.40 After lying dormant for two decades,
standing gained new found vigor as the Supreme Court became inun-
dated with numerous public law challenges requiring constitutional
adjudication. As the Warren Court began to recognize new substan-
tive rights involving privacy, equal protection, and due process, the
Court searched for a concept to help inform its development of public
law.41 Later, as the Court's ideology began to shift, the doctrine of
standing was narrowed and new requirements were added in an effort
to limit federal court access.42 Standing was just such an animal. This
bifurcated attempt to initially open and then limit judicial access has
continued to be a rationale, albeit an implicit one, for standing
jurisprudence.
pute.") (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because standing is a jurisdictional
question, it may be raised at any time either by the parties or by the court sua sponte. Id.
36. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) ("Standing in no way depends on the
merits of the plaintiff's contention .... ).
37. Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation
of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 882 (1983). It is important to distinguish between
looking at the claim, which is a necessary part of any standing analysis, and reaching the
merits. Only the latter is barred under traditional standing principles.
38. Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 37, 51-62.
39. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 224 (noting that "current standing law is a relatively
recent creation"); Sunstein, supra note 34, at 169 ("[S]tanding, as a distinct body of consti-
tutional law is an extraordinarily recent phenomenon.").
40. 321 U.S. 288, 304 (1944); see Sunstein, supra note 34, at 169.
41. Nichol, Rethinking Standing, supra note 2, at 73-74.
42. Id. at 75. While the Supreme Court's docket has remained static at around 150
cases a year, circuit courts have become more and more active, leading to the conclusion
that circuit courts are the final arbiter of many constitutional and statutory issues. LAW.
RENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 71-109 (3d ed. 1989).
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In addition to conserving judicial resources, the Court and com-
mentators have frequently identified other justifications and ratio-
nales for standing. None is more frequently identified or criticized
than the doctrine of separation of powers. Justice O'Connor suc-
cinctly identified separation of powers as a rationale in Allen v.
Wright.43 A year earlier, then-Judge Antonin Scalia justified separa-
tion of powers as the central rationale for standing. According to him,
"standing is a crucial and inseparable element of [separation of pow-
ers] whose disregard will inevitably produce, as it has in the past few
decades-an over judicialization of the process of self-governance."
44
For Justice Scalia and the Court, the requirement of a case or
controversy establishes parameters within which the Court is to make
access decisions. Going beyond these parameters would infringe on
both the executive and legislative branches and would allow nine
unelected individuals to issue advisory opinions and make public pol-
icy decisions more appropriately addressed by the representative
branches of government.45 Nearly ten years later, in Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife,4 6 Justice Scalia would express those same views in a
majority opinion and conclude that "the core component of standing
is an essential and unchanging part of the case or controversy require-
ment of Article III."'4
Another rationale for standing, closely related to principles of
separation of powers, is federalism. The same concern for an appro-
priate limitation on federal court power exists when the Court reviews
decisions made by state executive or legislative branches.48 Here the
concern is not with the preservation of coequal branches of govern-
43. 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984) ("[T]he idea of separation of powers counsels against
recognizing standing in a case brought ... to seek a restructuring of the apparatus estab-
lished by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties.... We could not recognize respon-
dents' standing in this case without running afoul of that structural principle.").
44. Scalia, supra note 37, at 881.
45. Allen, 468 U.S. at 759-61.
46. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
47. Id. at 560. Separation of powers as the underlying rationale has not gone without
criticism. See Gene R. Nichol, Abusing Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 113 U.
PENN. L. REv. 635, 636-50 (1985); see also Nichol, supra note 2, at 100 (arguing that "sepa-
ration of powers problems can be as readily presented by claims in which particularized
injury is clear"); Dana S. Treister, Comment, Standing To Sue the Government: Are Sepa-
ration of Powers Principles Really Being Served?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 689, 701-06 (1994)
(arguing that separation of powers is not served when the Court refuses to address appro-
priate constitutional claims).
48. State courts are not subject to the federal rules of standing. Doremus v. Board of
Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952).
1996] 1869
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ment, but with the respect of local and state decisions in a federal
system.
4 9
The adverse nature of American court proceedings led to the
early recognition of yet another standing rationale. The adversarial
process of American courts made standing necessary to "assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult consti-
tutional questions."5 0 Under this rationale, by requiring the plaintiff
to show redressable concrete injuries caused by the defendant, a court
is able to reach sound decisions with all of the arguments presented
and with faith that the issues were addressed in a clear and convincing
manner by both sides.-5 In short, standing "tends to assure that the
legal questions presented by the Court will be resolved, not in the
rarefied atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual
context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of
judicial action. '52
A more cynical rationale, and an often unstated but implicit be-
lief of many commentators, is that standing is a tool used to abdicate
judicial responsibility. Standing is a means of avoiding issues which, if
reached on the merits, would create public resentment, confused logic,
or significant amounts of additional litigation. At the same time,
many argue that when the Court decides it wants to hear the substan-
tive issues of a case it will ignore standing, create new requirements to
standing jurisprudence, or manipulate the underlying requirements to
actually reach the merits in an unprincipled fashion. 3 This use of
49. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 113 (1983) (standing denied in federal
suit against local police); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366 (1976) (standing denied be-
cause of "unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary into the discretionary authority
committed to state and local law to perform their official functions"); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488, 493-99 (1974) (denying standing to plaintiffs seeking to challenge discretion-
ary enforcement of state criminal laws); see also Nichol, supra note 2, at 99 (arguing that
Rizzo and O'Shea justified denials of standing because of an "unwarranted intrusion by the
federal judiciary into the discretionary authority committed to local and state authorities")
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
50. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
51. See Craig R. Gottlieb, Comment, How Standing Has Fallen: The Need To Separate
Constitutional and Prudential Concerns, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1063, 1069 (1994) ("By requir-
ing a vigorous adversary contest, standing serves the purposes of assuring a clear presenta-
tion of the issues so that a court can make an informed decision on the merits and produce
logical precedent.").
52. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
53. See supra notes 228-43 and accompanying text (identifying Powers v. Ohio, 410
U.S. 614, 616-19 (1973) as an example of the Court's result-oriented standing analysis).
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standing, as both a sword and a shield, has not been lost on commen-
tators54 and Supreme Court dissenters.55
B. Structure of Standing
1. Article III Requirements
a. Injury-in-fact
Probably the most important component of the constitutional
standing regime is the requirement of an injury-in-fact. In Association
of Data Processing Services Organizations Inc., v. Camp,"6 the Court
first recognized the need for some baseline injury component suffi-
cient to satisfy Article III. As initially conceived, this requirement
sought to replace the esoteric "legal interest" test with a more rea-
soned analysis which did not focus on the merits of the dispute. 7
Over the years, the injury-in-fact requirement has grown in com-
plexity such that now an injury meets Article III requirements only
when the plaintiff alleges an invasion of a "legally protected inter-
est"5 8 which is "distinct and palpable ' 59 and whose occurrence is "ac-
54. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 2, at 90 (arguing that the Court's refusal to find stand-
ing for a woman seeking child support in Linda R.S. v. Richard D. reflected the Court's
lack of empathy rather than any sound analysis of the standing doctrine).
55. See, e.g., Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 490 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the
Court disregards its constitutional responsibility when, by failing to acknowledge the pro-
tection afforded by the Constitution, it uses 'standing to slam the courthouse door against
plaintiffs who are entitled to full consideration on their claims on the merits' ") (quoting
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 178 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in result and dissent-
ing)); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 95 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court reached the merits of dispute, despite a lack of
standing, in order to "remove the doubt which has been cast over this important statute").
56. 397 U.S. 150 (1970); see Fletcher, supra note 2, at 230 (noting that Data Processing
is the intellectual foundation of modem injury in fact analysis).
57. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972); Nichol, Rethinking Standing,
supra note 2, at 74 n.36.
58. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). It is unclear what this
requirement adds to the standing analysis. It does not appear until the Court's 1992 deci-
sion in Lujan. If "legally protected interest" requires an analysis of the underlying claim, it
is at odds with a standing analysis unrelated to the merits. Furthermore, inquiry into a
"legally protected interest" cannot be understood as requiring that the underlying legally
protected interest be the plaintiff's since that would contradict third party standing juris-
prudence. The only case expressly addressing this language, Adarand Contractors, Inc. v.
Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), which held that the plaintiff's "claim that the Government's
use of subcontractor compensation clauses denies it equal protection of the laws of course
alleges invasion of a legally protected interest." Id. at 2104. Until the Court more substan-
tially addresses the legally protected interest component, it is speculative and unproductive
to attempt to divine its meaning.
59. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). The terms distinct and palpable were
later replaced with the requirement that the injuries be concrete and particularized. Lujan,
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tual or imminent" not merely "conjectural or hypothetical. ' 60 The
requirement of an actual or imminent injury was first recognized in
O'Shea v. Littleton.61 In O'Shea, the Court denied standing to a class
of plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief from allegedly discriminatory en-
forcement of criminal laws. 62 Although some of the plaintiffs had suf-
fered past discriminatory state action, there was no showing they
would suffer the injuries again. While past wrongs were probative of
"whether there [was] a real and immediate threat of repeated in-
jury,"63 the Court held that plaintiffs have standing only when their
injuries are "sufficiently real and immediate to show an existing
controversy."'6
In Los Angeles v. Lyons,65 the Court solidified the imminent in-
jury requirement for plaintiffs seeking declaratory or injunctive re-
lief.66 At issue in Lyons was the use of choke holds by members of the
Los Angeles Police Department. 67 In denying Lyons standing to sue,
the Court held that "[a]bsent a sufficient likelihood that he will again
be wronged in a similar way, Lyons is no more entitled to an injunc-
tion than any other citizen of Los Angeles.1 68 Finding it unlikely Ly-
504 U.S. at 560. The change in usage seems to be more concerned with diction than with
anything of substantive importance.
60. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons,
461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983)).
61. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
62. Id. at 496.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
66. Id. at 105. An imminent injury would not be required for restitution claims be-
cause the claimant is not seeking declaratory or injunctive relief.
67. lt at 98. Lyons sought to enjoin the police conduct and argued that it was the
policy of the police department to engage in unconstitutional choke holds in its daily law
enforcement capacity. Id. In dismissing the complaint, Justice White, writing for a five-
member majority, held that "Lyons' standing to seek the injunction requested depended on
whether he was likely to suffer future injury from the use of the choke hold by police
officers." It at 105.
68. Id. at 111. Lyons also alleged that he had personally suffered from institution of
the choke hold. It. at 105. He was not, however, barred from seeking compensation for
such injuries. Id The fact that Lyons suffered the injuries did not allow him to seek in-
junctive relief. According to the Court:
That Lyons may have been illegally choked by police ... while presumably afford-
ing Lyons' standing to claim damages against the individual officers and perhaps
against the City, does nothing to establish a real and immediate threat that he
would again be stopped for a traffic violation, or for any other offense, by an
officer or officers who would illegally choke him into unconsciousness without
any provocation or resistance on his part.
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ons would be subject to a choke hold again, the Court dismissed the
complaint.
69
The requirement of an "actual" injury is subtly different from the
requirement of imminence, a point which is illustrated by the death
penalty case Whitmore v. Arkansas.7° In Whitmore the Court sought
to limit redress of injuries it considered "speculative."' 71 The Court
rejected the intervention of Whitmore, a death row inmate, on behalf
of fellow inmate, Ronald Simmons, who had waived his right to appel-
late review.72 Arguing that the Eighth Amendment required
mandatory appellate review, Whitmore alleged that he was personally
injured because Simmons' crime would not be added to Arkansas'
comparative database.7 3 The Court, inan opinion by Justice Rehn-
quist, characterized such an injury as "too speculative to invoke the
jurisdiction of an Art. III court."74 Because Whitmore could not
demonstrate that he would be retried if he was allowed to intervene,
"it [was] nothing more than conjecture that the addition of Simmons'
crimes to a comparative review 'data base' would lead the Supreme
Court of Arkansas to set aside"7 5 Whitmore's death sentence.76 The
distinction between Whitmore and Lyons, though subtle, is important.
In Lyons the problem was not the injury (an unconstitutional choke
hold) but whether the plaintiff would suffer the injury again. In Whit-
more, by contrast, the problem was not only whether the plaintiff
would suffer an injury, but whether the injury (paucity of criminal
database) was an injury at all. These two interrelated requirements of
actual or imminent injury make up a distinct subcomponent of injury-
in-fact analysis.
b. Causation
The second component of Article III standing is the principle of
causation. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization77
established the modem causation standard which requires that an in-
69. Id. at 113.
70. 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
71. Id. at 157.
72. Id. at 161-66.
73. Such a database was used by the state supreme court to compare the heinousness
of a defendant's crime. Id. at 156-57.
74. Id at 157.
75. Id.
76. I& Whitmore's failure to allege an actual injury made his "[a]llegations of possible
future injury" fatally flawed because a "threatened injury must be 'certainly impending' to
constitute injury in fact." I&. at 158 (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 298
(1979)).
77. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
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jury-in-fact "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the de-
fendant, and not... result[] from the independent action of some
third party not before the court."'7 8 In Simon indigent individuals and
representative groups brought suit against the Secretary of the Treas-
ury and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.79 The plaintiffs took
issue with revenue rulings allowing favorable tax treatment to non-
profit hospitals who only offered emergency-room services for the
poor. 0 The Court dismissed the action." Although the plaintiffs suf-
fered a concrete injury (failure to get complete hospital services), it
was "purely speculative whether the denials of service ... fairly can be
traced" to the government's grant of favorable tax treatment. 82 Since
it could not be said that the favorable tax treatment caused the hospi-
tal to deny full services for indigent patients, causation was not met.
3
c. Redressability
The third and final component of Article III standing, and one
related to injury-in-fact 84 and causation, 5 is redressability. The Court
first identified redressability as a standing component in Linda R.S. v.
Richard D.16 and analytically distinguished it from the causation prin-
ciple in Allen v. Wright.8 7 Redressability requires that it be" 'likely' as
opposed to merely 'speculative' that the injury will be 'redressed by a
78. Id. at 41-42.
79. Id. at 28.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 46.
82. Id. at 42-43.
83. For another example of the Court's dismissal for lack of causation, see Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756-57 (1984) (denying standing because there was no evidence that
tax benefits caused segregative effect in schools).
84. The concept of redressability is linked to the injury-in-fact component because
defining an injury a particular way determines whether it is redressable. Take, for exam-
ple, an affirmative action case in which the plaintiff alleges that a racial set-aside for con-
tracts violates the equal protection clause. If the Court chooses to define the injury in
terms of the ability to secure a government contract, striking down the set-aside may not
ensure that the plaintiff will receive the contract. The action is therefore not redressable.
On the other hand, if the Court defines the injury in terms of the ability to compete equally
for a government contract, striking down the set-aside will redress the plaintiff's injury. See
General Contractors v. Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 2297, 2303 (1993).
85. "The 'fairly traceable' and 'redressability' components of the constitutional stand-
ing inquiry were initially articulated by th[e] Court as 'two facets of a single causation
requirement.' " Allen, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19 (citing CHARLES WRirHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 13, 68 n.43 (4th ed. 1983)). However, "[t]o the extent there is a difference, it is
that the former examines the causal connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct
and the alleged injury, whereas the latter examines the causal connection between the
alleged injury and the judicial relief requested." Id.
86. 410 U.S. 614, 616-19 (1973).
87. See 468 U.S. at 753.
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favorable decision' "8 of the Court.8 9 The distinction between redres-
sability and causation is a subtle one, but essentially focuses on the
injury and its causal connection to either the defendant's conduct or
the requested remedy.
Redressability, like causation, reflects efficiency as well as separa-
tion of powers concerns because it discourages advisory opinions and
restrains courts from adjudicating matters when a favorable decision
will not operate to make the petitioning party whole. In conformity
with the adversarial process, the need for concrete factual issues
rather than an amorphous "debating society"9 is served by a standing
analysis focused on the practical and immediate impact of its
decisions.
2. Prudential Limitations
Unlike injury, causation, and redressability, prudential limitations
are not constitutionally required. Instead, prudential limitations are
an aspect of "judicial self-government" 91 created so a court will "not
be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public signifi-
cance." g These limitations are essentially "rules of self-restraint
founded upon the recognition that the political branches of govern-
ment are generally better suited to resolving disputes involving mat-
ters of broad public significance. '93 Since these policy reasons are
quite similar to the doctrine of separation of powers and reflect many
of the same constitutional values associated with the "case and contro-
88. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,561 (1992) (quoting Simon v. Eastern
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
89. The application of redressablity is illustrated by Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at (1975),
which involved nonpayment of child support by a father of an illegitimate child. Texas,
which jailed fathers of legitimate children for failure to pay child support, did not apply
similar coercive measures to the fathers of illegitimate children. Id. at 615-16. The Court
failed to reach the merits of the mother's equal protection claim. Since the requested relief
would "result only in the jailing" of the father, it was "speculative" as to whether the
mother would get the support payments she sought. IL at 618. She therefore lacked
standing to sue. Id. at 619. For additional applications of the redressability component, see
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557-68 (plurality opinion) (plaintiffs failed to allege redressable injury
because it was unclear whether Secretary of Interior could bar other governmental agen-
cies from funding environmentally destructive foreign projects); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 505-08 (1975) (standing denied to various individuals and groups who alleged uncon-
stitutional exclusionary zoning because there was no evidence that the removal of the zon-
ing ordinances "would benefit petitioners").
90. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
91. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
92. Warth, 422 U.S. at 500.
93. Apache Bends Apts. v. United States through IRS, 987 F.2d 1174, 1176 (5th Cir.
1993).
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versy" requirement, the Court "has not always been clear" whether it
was undertaking a prudential or constitutional analysis of standing.94
Despite the similarities between prudential and constitutional
limitations, there are two distinct prudential limitations which, in re-
cent years, have developed a substantial body of Supreme Court pre-
cedent. These are the general limitation on third party standing and
the prudential limitation called zone of interest. Each is court-im-
posed and may be ignored if Congress clearly expresses its intent to
do so.95
a. Third Party Standing
As a general rule, parties may not assert the constitutional rights
of third parties.96 This requirement is consistent with a standing doc-
trine concerned with maintaining an adversarial process where the
parties have a significant stake in the outcome.97 Furthermore, it re-
flects concerns about "the adjudication of rights which those not
before the Court may not wish to assert"98 because, when recognized,
third party standing allows the vicarious assertion of individual rights.
Despite a general antipathy toward third party standing, the
Court has developed a three-part exception. 99 Under this exception, a
party may assert the rights of a third party if: (1) the litigant has "suf-
fered an injury in fact thus giving him or her 'a sufficiently concrete
94. See Valley Forge Christian College, 454 U.S. at 471 ("[I]t has not always been clear
in the opinions of this Court whether particular features of the 'standing' requirement have
been required by Article III ex propio vigore, or whether they are requirements that the
court has erected and which were not compelled by the language of the Constitution.").
95. Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 ("[Congress may grant an express right of action to persons
who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing rules.").
96. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400,410 (1991); see generally, Henry D. Monaghan, Third
Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 277 (1984) (analyzing the doctrine of third party
standing).
97. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 82 (1994).
98. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978).
99. In addition to this general three part exception, the Court has recognized a "sub-
stantial overbreadth" exception which is unique to overly broad statutes which infringe on
First Amendment free speech rights. WILLIAM B. LOCKHART et al. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES-COMMENTS-QuEsTIONs 753 (7th ed. 1991); see, e.g., Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103,
122 (1990) (upholding conviction against substantial overbreadth challenge); Brockett v.
Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 501 (1985) (upholding moral nuisance statute despite
overbreadth challenge); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1983) (upholding child
pornography statute notwithstanding overbreadth challenge); see generally, TRIBE, supra
note 8, at 1022-39 (outlining and critiquing the substantial overbreadth doctrine); Law-
rence A. Alexander, Is There an Overbreadth Doctrine?, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 541 (1985)
(same); Henry D. Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 Sup. CT. REv. 1 (same); Martin Redish,
The Warren Court, The Burger Court and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78
Nw. U. L. REv. 1031, 1056-69 (1983) (same).
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interest' in the outcome of the issue in dispute"; 10 (2) there is "some
hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own inter-
est";101 and (3) the litigant "has a close relationship to the third
party."'102 In addition to meeting these three requirements, the litigat-
ing party must also meet the additional constitutional requirements of
causation and redressability since Article III is neither waiveable nor
mutable. 0 3
b. Zone of Interest
A second prudential limitation, related to the considerations of
third party standing, is the zone of interest requirement. 0 4 This limi-
tation was first recognized in Association of Data Processing Service
Organizations, Inc. v. Camp.'0 5 According to the Court, a plaintiff has
standing "if the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is
arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."'0 6 This require-
ment is justifiable since only plaintiffs who are the intended benefi-
ciaries of a statute or administrative regulation should be able to sue.
This requirement also ensures the adverseness of the issues presented
to the court.'0 7 In areas outside administrative and statutory regula-
tion, however, it does not appear that the zone of interest requirement
adds anything not already addressed by third party considerations.'
For example, if a plaintiff alleges a personal violation of free speech,
that party is within the zone of interest. If the party alleges violation
of someone else's free speech rights, third party prudential limitations
would apply.
100. Powers, 499 U.S. at 410 (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976)).
101. Id. at 411.
102. Id.
103. See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163-64 (1990) (requiring that defendant
must satisfy the requirements of Article III even if asserting the rights of a third party); see
also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 82-83 ("It must be stressed that the person seeking to
advocate the rights of third parties must meet the constitutional standing requirements of
injury, causation and redressability .... ).
104. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 142-45 (identifying the similarities between third party
standing and zone of interest prudential limitations). For a more in depth discussion of the
background of and justifications for the zone of interest limitation, see Sanford A. Church,
Note, A Defense of the 'Zone of Interest' Standing Test, 1983 DuKE L.J. 447.
105. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
106. Id. at 153.
107. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 99.
108. Id. at 101 ("If a person is asserting an injury to his or her constitutional rights, the
zone of interest test is met. If an individual is not asserting a personally suffered wrong,
then the requirement for injury or at least the bar against third-party standing would pre-
clude review.").
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III. GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES: PRUDENTIAL OR
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATION?
Notably absent from the above consideration of prudential limi-
tations are generalized grievances. This term of art has been cata-
loged as a prudential limitation in all too familiar passages at the
beginning of most standing opinions.10 9 From a broad definitional
standpoint, generalized grievances have been variously described as
complaints "shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
class of citizens,"" 0 as grievances associated with taxpayer standing,"'
as mere interests in having the government follow the law," 2 as citizen
suits," 3 and as injuries associated with racial stigmatization."
4
Moving beyond generalities, however, it is far from clear whether
generalized grievances are rooted in Article III, are prudential limita-
tions, are neither, or both. The confusion surrounding the classifica-
tion of generalized grievances is disconcerting. Not only does it
demonstrate the inability of the Court to adhere to a basic analysis,
but the confusion has real world implications because of fundamental
and important differences between Article III and prudential
limitations.
The distinction between prudential and constitutional limitations
is an important one." 5 Because Article III is nondiscretionary, cate-
gorizing generalized grievances as a constitutional limitation removes
from the court and the other branches of government any power to
broaden judicial access. 116 The irreducible minima of injury, causa-
tion, and redressability are just that-irreducible. On the other hand,
109. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,498-502 (1975) (outlining the Court's stand-
ing analysis).
110. Id. at 499.
111. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 2, at 267 (characterizing the generalized grievance
cases in terms of taxpayer standing).
112. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 89 (characterizing generalized griev-
ances as mere interests in having the government follow the law).
113. See, e.g., 13 CHARLES WRIM-rT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.10, 634-43 (1984) (analyzing generalized grievances in terms of citizen suits).
114. See, eg., Hays v. Louisiana, 115 S. Ct. 2431,2436 (1995) (denying standing because
of an insufficient stigmatic injury).
115. See generally, Gottlieb, supra note 51, at 1063 (demonstrating the importance of
separating prudential and constitutional standing requirements).
116. See Gottlieb, supra note 51, at 1067. ("[W]hen a court identifies a limitation as
constitutional which the court should have identified as prudential, the court actually pre-
vents future courts and Congress from considering situations where the prudential con-
cerns might be outweighed by countervailing considerations.").
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generalized grievances as a prudential limitation can be broadened by
congressional action.
117
A. Generalized Grievances as a Prudential Limitation
In a series of housing rights cases, the Court recognized Con-
gress's ability to expand standing to the limits of Article III. In so
doing the Court undertook a thorough analysis of prudential limita-
tions and squarely placed generalized grievances within this category.
In Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,"18 the Court consid-
ered the application of the Fair Housing Act.119 Alleging violation of
that Act, two individuals brought suit asserting discrimination by a
landlord in his treatment of housing applicants. 20 Finding that both
parties had standing, the Court took notice of Congress's intent to
confer standing "as broadly as permitted by Article III.
1121
In Warth v. Seldin,'2 the Court confronted a constitutional chal-
lenge to allegedly exclusionary zoning by a Rochester, New York sub-
urb. In dismissing the complaints of various organizations and
individuals who lived outside the zoned suburb, the Court set forth in
117. While it is clear that Congress may reduce the compass of prudential limitations it,
is less clear whether lower courts may do so. See Tax Analysts & Advocates v. Blumenthal,
566 F.2d 130, 137 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978). The Court in
Blumenthal stated:
[T]he fact that the [non-constitutional] limitations of the standing doctrine ... are
termed 'prudential limitations' does not mean that the lower courts have discre-
tion as to whether to apply these limitations or not. The Supreme Court has
announced these prudential limitations in its supervisory capacity over the federal
judiciary and . . .we believe there is a nondiscretionary duty to apply the
limitation.
Id. In addition, if the Supreme Court remains true to stare decisis, there is little it can do to
reverse or limit prudential limitations. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-01 (1975), the
Court did hold that in "some circumstances, countervailing considerations may outweigh
the concerns underlying the usual reluctance to exert judicial power when the plaintiff's
claim to relief rests on the legal rights of third parties." Id. at 500-01. It should be stressed
that this balancing test was the impetus for the three part third party exception and has
never been applied to generalized grievances or zone of interest limitations. The ability of
countervailing principles to broaden standing at the judicial level is therefore limited and
constrained.
118. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
119. Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 801, 82 Stat. 81, codified as
amended 42 U.S.C. § 3601-3631 (1968)).
120. The first defendant, a black man, acted as a tester and was given misinformation
about apartment availability. The second defendant was a white man who lived in the
apartment complex and who claimed that he was stigmatized by living in a "white ghetto"
and suffered an injury in fact because he was denied the "social benefits of living in an
integrated community." Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 208.
121. Id. at 209.
122. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
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dicta the basic requirements of standing jurisprudence. According to
the Court:
Apart from [the] minimum constitutional mandate, this
Court has recognized outer limits on the class of persons who
may invoke the court's decisional and remedial powers.
First, the Court has held that when the asserted harm is a"generalized grievance" shared in substantially equal mea-
sure by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone nor-
mally does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction. 23
This identification of generalized grievances as a prudential limitation
was to prevail in subsequent cases citing the Warth rationale. 2 4
B. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Generalized Grievances as a
Constitutional Requirement
In 1992, generalized grievances seemed to undergo significant re-
vision in a watershed standing decision involving environmental pro-
tection. At issue in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife'" was a decision by
the Secretary of the Interior regarding the application of the Endan-
gered Species Act 126 to actions in foreign nations. Defenders of Wild-
life, a conservation group, filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment
that the new regulation violated the "geographic scope" of the Endan-
gered Species Act. 27
123. Id. at 499.
124. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,474-75 (1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood 441
U.S. 91, 100 (1979).
125. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
126. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended, 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1543 (1973)). The Endangered Species Act of 1973 requires
the Secretary of the Interior to "insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out"
by a federal agency does not "jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered spe-
cies." Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 510 F. Supp. 1186 (D.C. Dist. Col. 1981),
affd, 685 F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Secretary of the Interior interpreted these re-
quirements as requiring application only to domestic operations and activities on the high
seas. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-59.
127. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559. Two Defenders of Wildlife members traveled to Egypt in
1986 and "observed the traditional habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile," and alleged
that they suffered an injury-in-fact because of the United States' "role ... in overseeing the
rehabilitation of the Aswan High Dam." Id. at 563 These individuals stated in their plead-
ings their intent to return to Egypt in the foreseeable future and asserted as injury their
inability to view the Nile crocodile which was being threatened by the Aswan Project. Id.
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court rejected such "some day intentions" and denied
standing on this basis because of the plaintiff's failure to allege an "imminent" injury. Id.
at 562-67 "[W]ithout any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of
when the some day will be" the plaintiffs did not establish the "actual or imminent" injury
required by Article III. Id. at 564.
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Plaintiffs alleged standing, in part, on the basis of a citizen suit
provision of the Endangered Species Act. Under this provision,
"[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own behalf (a) to
enjoin any person, including the United States and any other govern-
mental instrumentality or agency.., who is alleged to be in violation
of any provision of the chapter."'1 8 Because Warth held that "the in-
jury required by Article III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creat-
ing legal rights the invasion of which creates standing,"'2 9 it appeared
that this citizen suit provision would be sufficient to establish plain-
tiffs' standing.
The Court rejected this argument and denied standing, holding
that Article III does not recognize a "congressional conferral upon all
persons of an abstract, self contained, non-instrumental 'right' to have
the Executive observe the procedures required by law."' 3 Accord-
ingly, a right to protect endangered species and to have government
agencies follow the dictates of the Endangered Species Act cannot be
created by Congress because it interferes with Article III require-
ments of standing and infringes on the role of the Executive. In the
most important passage for purposes here, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Scalia, stated:
We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a gen-
erally available grievance about government-claiming only
harm to his and every citizen's interest in proper application
of the constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more
directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large-does not state an Article III case or controversy.'3'
This statement appears to switch application of generalized griev-
ances from a prudential limitation to a core component of the "case or
controversy" requirement. Because the Court concluded that the citi-
zen suit provision was a generalized grievance and held that genera-
lized grievances were barred by Article III requirements, Congress
could not confer standing merely by granting a procedural right to
sue. To allow Congress to do so "would be disregarding a principle
fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional role of the
Third Branch"' and would "transfer from the President to the courts
128. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (1973).
129. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410
U.S. 614, 616 (1973)).
130. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573.
131. Id. at 573-74 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 576.
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the Chief Executive's most important constitutional duty, to 'take care
that the laws are faithfully executed.' ,"133
After the Lujan decision was announced commentators were
quick to criticize its holding and demonstrate that Justice Scalia's
opinion represented a significant departure from past standing juris-
prudence. Professor Sunstein described the decision as ranking
among "the most important in history in terms of the sheer number of
federal statutes that it has apparently invalidated,"'134 and Professor
Nichol criticized the decision for being "difficult to square with the
language and history of Article III, with the injury requirement itself,
with more modest visions of judicial power and with time-honored
notions of public law litigation."' 135 Furthermore, commentators as-
serted that Justice Scalia's analysis of citizen suits and his identifica-
tion of the procedural injury as a generalized grievance marked a shift
from a prudential to an Article III foundation. 36
While Justice Scalia's opinion characterized generalized griev-
ances as a constitutional limitation, it is unclear whether Lujan was as
significant a departure as some commentators have suggested. The
Court's failure to confer standing in citizen suits is of course novel and
important.137 Yet the Court's decision to characterize generalized
grievances as Article III limitations may not have been inaccurate or
terribly new.
Looking first within the four corners of Lujan, the failure of the
Court to overrule the string of cases characterizing generalized griev-
133. Id. at 577 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II § 3).
134. Sunstein, supra note 34, at 165.
135. Nichol, supra note 2, at 142-43.
136. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 95 ("Lujan likely means that the bar
against generalized grievances will be treated as constitutional and not prudential in the
future."); Gottlieb, supra note 51, at 1106-07 ("The Court in Lujan ... specifically takes
this prudential concern-generalized grievances-and imports into it its constitutional
analysis by interpreting Article III as prohibiting generalized grievances."); Patti A.
Meeks, Justice Scalia and the Demise of Environmental Law Standing, 8 J. LAND USE &
ENvrL. L. 343, 362-63 (1993) (arguing that Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Lujan trans-
ferred generalized grievances from a prudential to an Article III limitation); Douglas
Parker, Standing to Litigate "Abstract Social Interests" in the United States and Italy; Reex-
amining "Injury in Fact," 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 270 n.40 (1995) (noting that
"Justice Scalia seems to be transforming the 'generalized grievance' limitations from a pru-
dential consideration that can be waived or set aside by Congress into one of the core
elements of standing"); Patrick L. Proctor, Comment, No Generalized Grievances: The
"Law of Rules" Approach to Standing, 19 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 927, 935 (1993) (arguing that
generalized grievances are now a constitutionally imposed limitation); Treister, supra note
47, at 719 (arguing that Lujan's emphasis on injury-in-fact makes clear that generalized
grievances are now constitutionally prohibited).
137. See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 197-222 (outlining and demonstrating the significant
shift Lujan represents in "citizen suits").
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ances as prudentially based is noteworthy. 138 In fact, the Court sought
to distinguish Trafficante,139 which first identified generalized griev-
ances as prudential limits.1 40 Absent specific language by the Court
identifying a shift in understanding, generalized grievances may retain
a residual prudential limitation.
Perhaps the clearest evidence that Lujan did not signify a radical
move from a prudential to a constitutional understanding of genera-
lized grievances comes from an analysis of federal circuit court deci-
sions handed down after Lujan. If Lujan marked a significant
departure as many have thought, it seems logical that circuit courts
would have recognized this and no longer described or analyzed gen-
eralized grievances under a prudential limitation rubric. In fact, an
analysis of circuit court cases demonstrates that the exact opposite has
occurred.
In Benjamin v. Aroostook Medical Center, Inc., 1 ' handed down
well after the Lujan opinion, the First Circuit listed "[s]everal pruden-
tial considerations" which "infuse standing determinations."'142
Among these were "abstract questions of wide public significance es-
sentially amounting to generalized grievances more appropriately ad-
dressed to the representative branches."'143 Although Benjamin did
not expressly rest on concerns about generalized grievances, the
court's litany of prudential considerations included generalized griev-
ances. While such statements are dicta, they demonstrate that a
revolution in generalized grievance understanding has not occurred.
Similar characterizations of generalized grievances as prudential limi-
tations have occurred in every circuit discussing prudential limitations
138. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text (discussing the initial identification
of generalized grievances as prudential limitations).
139. 409 U.S. 205 (1972); see supra notes 118-21 and accompanying text (discussing the
Court's holding in Trafficante).
140. According to the Lujan Court, Trafficante was distinguishable because in the latter
opinion "Congress elevat[ed] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto
injuries that were previously inadequate in the law ...." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992). It is not readily apparent why an individual interest in living in an
integrated community is any less abstract than the personal interest in viewing endangered
species, particularly for professional environmentalists. The Court's distinction of Traf-
ficante certainly is supported by the thinnest of reeds.
141. 57 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1995).
142. Ila at 104.
143. Id.
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after the Lujan decision, including the First,1 4 Third,1 45 Fifth,146 Sev-
enth,147 Eighth, 48 and Eleventh 49 Circuits.
Given the breadth of support for a prudentially imposed limita-
tion in the circuit courts, a conclusion that Lujan transferred genera-
lized grievances entirely from a prudential limitation entirely to an
Article III foundation seems premature. This circuit court evidence
does not mean generalized grievances are not constitutionally limited.
All these post-Lujan cases suggest is that Lujan did not entirely re-
move generalized grievances from a prudentially based analysis alto-
gether. To understand why this is true and to more fully comprehend
the confusion surrounding the theoretical foundations of generalized
grievances, it is helpful to explore exactly how the Court has devel-
oped the generalized grievance limitation on federal court access. As
generalized grievances gain in clarity, so too will the argument that
generalized grievances have never been an analytically distinct pru-
dential limitation.
IV. CHARACTERIZING GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES
Beyond the uncertainty about whether generalized grievances are
constitutional or prudential limitations, there is also uncertainty about
their precise definition. According to Professor Chemerinsky, "[A]
generalized grievance is where the plaintiffs sue solely as citizens con-
cerned with having the government follow the law or as taxpayers in-
terested in restraining allegedly illegal government expenditures.' ' °
On the other hand, the Court has alternatively described generalized
grievances as existing when "the asserted harm is... shared in a sub-
stantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens"' 5' or when
the harm is associated with "every citizen's interest in proper applica-
tion of the Constitution and laws" and the plaintiff is "seeking relief
144. Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915, 918 n.7 (1st Cir. 1993) (listing generalized griev-
ances as a separate and distinct prudential limitation).
145. Wheeler v. Travelers Ins. Co., 22 F.3d 534, 538 (3d Cir. 1994) (listing generalized
grievances as a separate and distinct prudential limitation).
146. Apache v. United States through I.R.S., 987 F.2d 1174, 1176 (5th Cir. 1993) (listing
generalized grievances as a separate and distinct prudential limitation).
147. Family & Children's Ctr. v. School City, 13 F.3d 1052, 1059 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
School City of Mishawaka v. Family & Children's Ctr., Inc., 115 S. Ct. 420 (1994) (listing
generalized grievances as a separate and distinct prudential limitation).
148. Von Kerssenbrock-Praschma v. Saunders, 48 F.3d 323, 325 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) (list-
ing generalized grievances as a separate and distinct prudential limitation).
149. Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 1994) (listing genera-
lized grievances as a separate and distinct prudential limitation).
150. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 89.
151. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
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that no more directly benefits the plaintiffs than the public at
large." '152 Mindful that generalizations about standing "are largely
worthless,"'153 it is still necessary to explore these statements in more
detail.
A. Injuries Which Affect Everyone Equally
The notion that a generalized grievance exists whenever the
"harm asserted is shared in substantially equal measure by all or a
large class of citizens"'154 is logical enough. After all, when everyone
asserts a right, that right is "generalized" in the sense of not being
unique. Yet further reflection on this definition demonstrates its
flaws.
An example best illustrates the point. Assume that as the United
States enters the twenty-first century crime is dramatically on the rise.
As a result of this epidemic, prisons are overflowing, prison riots are
on the horizon, and financially strapped states are pleading for federal
relief. In an effort to lessen the costs of maintenance, Congress passes
a comprehensive statute. In addition to granting money to the states,
the statute includes the following passage: "1) Be it enacted that
every man, woman and child over the age of sixteen shall serve two
weeks in a designated jail, prison, or penitentiary for the purposes of
cleaning toilets, scrubbing tiles, and generally maintaining the physical
conditions of the nation's correctional facilities. This service shall be
without compensation, and is the duty of every citizen."
Such a statute affects nearly everyone in the nation. It affects
everyone equally because virtually everyone will have to perform
these duties. Can it honestly be supposed that no one subject to that
provision would have standing to challenge the statute simply because
a great number of other citizens are similarly situated? It seems un-
likely given the magnitude of the injury at stake.
The types of cases embracing a generalized grievance analysis,
however, have not been limited to injuries which affect a large group.
Generalized grievances have also been invoked in situations where
minority groups claim a stigmatic injury unique to their group iden-
tity."'55 Characterizing generalized grievances as large group injuries
shared in substantially equal measure does not explain these cases.
Stigmatic injuries are often alleged and suffered by discrete and insu-
lar minorities who. because of their minority status in the United
152. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
153. Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
154. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
155. See infra notes 203-244 and accompanying text.
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States, cannot realistically suffer a broad injury shared by all or most
citizens. If a small group of Eskimos claimed state action stigmatized
them in some way it would hardly seem accurate to describe their in-
jury as "shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
class.'
156
The Supreme Court has also recognized the fallacy underlying
standing decisions based solely on the number of individuals affected.
According to Chief Justice Warren: "To deny standing to persons who
are in fact injured simply because many others are also injured, would
mean that the most injurious and widespread Government actions
could be questioned by nobody."' 57 As a matter of logic and policy,
"the existence of a generalized grievance is not determined simply by
the number of people affected.' 5 8
B. Injuries Associated With "Constitutional Governance"
A series of Supreme Court cases have denied federal court access
when the plaintiff's asserted right concerns an injury associated with
Constitutional process limitations. These cases, which span a period
of constitutional history well before modern standing jurisprudence,
stand for the idea that the plaintiff must assert more than a right to
have the government follow the internal constitutional structures of
the United States' constitutional democracy.
In Fairchild v. Hughes'5 9 the Court, in an opinion by Justice Bran-
deis, dismissed a challenge to the validity of the procedures used to
ratify the Nineteenth Amendment. Holding that the Court did not
have jurisdiction under Article III, Justice Brandeis noted that the
"[p]laintiff has [asserted] only the right, possessed by every citizen, to
require that the government be administered according to the law and
that the public moneys not be wasted. Obviously this general right
does not entitle a private citizen to institute... a suit ....160
156. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
157. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973);. But see United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974)
("In a very real sense, the absence of any particular individual or class to litigate these
claim[s] gives support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the surveil-
lance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process.").
158. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 89; see also Treister, supra note 47, at 709
("[G]overnmentf ] acts (or failure to act) may injure a plaintiff, even though the injury is
widely shared by others.").
159. 258 U.S. 126 (1922).
160. Id. at 129-30.
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Similarly, in Ex Parte Levitt,161 the Supreme Court confronted a
potentially embarrassing decision regarding one of its recent mem-
bers. Levitt filed suit, alleging that Justice Hugo Black had been nom-
inated to the Supreme Court in violation of Article I, section 6, clause
2 of the Constitution. 162 The Court's per curiam decision failed to
reach the merits:
It is an established principle that to entitle a private individ-
ual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of
executive or legislative action he must show that he has sus-
tained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct in-
jury as a result of that action and it is not sufficient that he
has merely a general interest common to all members of the
public.
163
Ex Parte Levitt and Fairchild v. Hughes were handed down well
before modem standing jurisprudence had taken hold. Trying to fit
either within a prudential or constitutional framework is inappropri-
ate. Nevertheless, Levitt and Fairchild demonstrate that interests as-
sociated only with having the Constitution obeyed are not enough to
gain federal court access. The impact of Levitt and Fairchild is to re-
move, for all practical purposes, the emolument' 64 and ratification165
provisions from the realm of judicial review at-least with respect to
private citizens. 66 In so holding, Levitt and Fairchild are the intellec-
161. 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam).
162. Id. at 633. Article I, § 6, cl. 2 reads: "No Senator or Representative shall, during
the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of
the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have
been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
163. Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. at 634.
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
165. U.S. CONST. art. V.
166. The ability of members of Congress to challenge the constitutionality of.laws not
personally affecting them has not been addressed by the Supreme Court. "Public officials
ordinarily fare no better than private individuals in efforts to assert general public inter-
ests." WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 113, at 641, n.19. Nevertheless, a series of District of
Columbia Circuit Court cases has held that members of Congress may have standing to
assert what are arguably generalized grievances when "the member of Congress claims a
nullification of his or her vote." CIEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 106; see, e.g., Barnes v.
Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 25-30 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that Senator has standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a pocket veto), vacated as moot sub. nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S.
361 (1987); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697,702 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc)(per curiam) (hold-
ing that Senators have standing to challenge validity of treaty recision), vacated, 444 U.S.
996 (1979); Daughtrey v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050,1058 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that a mem-
ber of Congress lacks standing to challenge presidential pardon of Vietnam draft resisters);
Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430,433 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that Senators have stand-
ing to challenge validity of treaty recision); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315
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tual genesis for the proposition that "a plaintiff... claiming only harm
to his and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Consti-
tution and laws . . . does not state an Article III case or
controversy."1
67
Twenty-seven years after the Court handed down its decision in
Ex Parte Levitt, the Court once again faced interpreting Article I, sec-
tion 6, clause 2 and again chose not to reach the merits. Schlesinger v.
Reservists Committee to Stop the War1 68 was an action for declaratory
and injunctive relief brought by members of the Armed Forces Re-
serve who opposed the war in Vietnam. The group brought a class
action on behalf of all United States citizens and argued that certain
members of Congress violated Article I's incompatibility clause
169
when they served in the Army Reserve and held office as members of
Congress.
170
In dismissing the plaintiffs' action, the Court characterized the
underlying injury as a "generalized" one.17  While portraying the in-
jury as a "generalized grievance," the Court squarely placed its hold-
ing within the injury-in-fact component of Article II[.172 According to
the Court, "[t]he only interest all citizens share in the claim.., is one
which presents injury in the abstract."'17 3 Such injuries do not provide
standing because they are not "concrete,"' 74 and because finding in-
jury in the abstract "would create the potential for abuse of the judi-
cial process, distort the role of the Judiciary in its relationship to the
(2d Cir. 1973) (holding that a member of Congress lacks standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the bombing of Cambodia), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Edwards v.
Carter, 445 F. Supp. 1279, 1286 (D.D.C.) (denying standing to members of Congress who
challenged submission of the Panama Canal treaty only to the Senate.), aff'd on other
grounds, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 104-
10 (outlining legislators' standing); Carl McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New
Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241 (1981) (same).
167. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
168. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
169. Id. at 211. The relevant provision of the constitution provides: "[N]o Person hold-
ing any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
continuance in Office." U.S. CONsr. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
170. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 210-211.
171. Id. at 217. The conclusion that members of the Reserve had a general interest has
not gone without criticism. See Gottlieb, supra note 51, at 1096 (arguing that the plaintiffs
in Schlesinger "were members of the Reserve itself, and therefore had an interest above
and beyond that of the population at large.").
172. TRIBE, supra note 8, at 125 ("In Schlesinger, Chief Justice Burger's majority opin-
ion held that 'the generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance,' which
was the interest alleged to be adversely affected, is too 'abstract' to give rise to 'concrete
injury' of the sort which constitutes 'injury in fact.' ") (citations omitted).
173. Schlesinger, 418 U.S. at 217.
174. Id. at 222.
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Executive and the Legislature and open the Judiciary to an arguable
charge of providing 'government by injunction.' "175
On the same day Schlesinger was announced, United States v.
Richardson'76 held, on similar grounds, that a generalized grievance
by a taxpayer did not meet the standing requirement of federal juris-
diction. 7 7 At issue in Richardson were provisions of the Central In-
telligence Agency Act of 1949 concerning public reporting of
expenditures. 78 Richardson argued that the CIA's failure to report
its expenditures violated a clause of the Constitution which requires
publication of a regular accounting of expenditures of public
money.179 Relying on the Court's earlier taxpayer cases and citing the
Court's decision in Levitt for support, Chief Justice Burger character-
ized Richardson's complaint as "undifferentiated and 'common to all
members of the public.' "180 The only injury alleged by respondent
was an inability to 'obtain a document that sets out the expenditures
and receipts' of the CIA."'' Such an injury, according to the Court,
was "surely... a generalized grievance.'1 8 2 The Court went on to
explain:
While we can hardly dispute that this respondent has a genu-
ine interest in the use of funds and that his interest may be
prompted by his status as a taxpayer, he has not alleged that,
as a taxpayer, he is in danger of suffering any particular con-
crete injury as a result of the operation of this statute.
l 3
The intellectual foundation of the Richardson decision rested
with the insufficiency of the alleged injury. By the time Richardson
was announced, injury was a distinct component of Article III stand-
ing requirements.l" Although some commentators have questioned
whether Richardson was based on prudential or Article III limitations,
the Court's emphasis on injury, and its failure to even mention pru-
dential limitations, 85 suggests an Article III basis for the decision.
175. Id.
176. 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
177. Id. at 179-80.
178. Id. at 167.
179. Id. at 168; see U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 ("[A] regular Statement and Account of
the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.").
180. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 177 (quoting Ex Parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
181. Id. at 169.
182. Id. at 176.
183. Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
184. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
185. Justice Powell's concurring opinion did mention prudential limitations. Richard-
son, 418 U.S. at 181 (Powell, J., concurring).
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By way of summary, the Court's decisions in Levitt, Fairchild,
Schlesinger and Richardson stand for a basic proposition: To satisfy
the requirements of Article III a plaintiff must allege a more personal-
ized injury than an interest in constitutional governance. Failure to
differentiate a claim and show.some "concrete injury"'186 outside con-
stitutional impropriety is insufficient. Understood this way, most gen-
eralized grievances will occur under Article I sections which do not
confer individual rights and which focus on the process by which the
government operates. 87 Such injuries are generalized because the
plaintiff is merely asking for constitutional adherence. Conferring
standing in such situations gives the distinct impression of "govern-
ment by injunction"'' 8 and forces the Court to go beyond its constitu-
tional role as the court of last resort in adversarial proceedings.
Characterizing generalized grievances in terms of a theory of
"constitutional governance" adds more to the analysis than mere inju-
ries which affect a large group equally. Consider the prison hypotheti-
cal outlined earlier. Although subjecting virtually every citizen to two
weeks of uncompensated work affects a large group, it does not raise
issues of constitutional governance. While Ralph from Boise and
Margaret from New York allege the same constitutional infringe-
ments, both allege more than a desire to have the government follow
the law. Each is personally denied an individual right and suffers an
individualized injury. The fact that many share the injury does noth-
ing to reduce the personalized nature of the injury.
Generalized grievance jurisprudence might, therefore, be under-
stood as differentiating between constitutional provisions which grant
individual rights and constitutional provisions which outline and de-
termine the basis of America's constitutional structure.8 9 For exam-
ple, a broad distinction might be drawn between Article I and the first
186. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 179-80.
187. Article I encompasses most generalized grievances because it establishes most of
the principles under which the government operates. Nevertheless, other provisions in-
cluding Art. II, the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, and the Tenth Amendment,
may easily fall within this category of procedural governance.
188. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
189. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 68-69 ("In general, a person who claims discrimi-
nation or a violation of an individual liberty, such as freedom of speech or due process of
law, will be accorded standing. But someone who seeks to prevent a violation of a consti-
tutional provision dealing with the structure of government is unlikely to be accorded




nine amendments to the Constitution.190 Since most provisions of Ar-
ticle I set out the powers and structure of Congress, it is less likely that
interests beyond constitutional governance will exist. On the other
hand, Eighth Amendment guarantees against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment confer an individual right not to be subject to capricious state
action.
Such broad generalizations are unfortunately of little utility. The
Commerce Clause91 ' is a case in point. While the Commerce Clause
concerns the power of the federal government in a federalist system,
and is therefore a structural provision, standing can and has been es-
tablished in Commerce Clause cases. A convicted felon arrested
under a federal law prohibiting the possession of guns in a school zone
may challenge Congress's power to enact such a provision because his
interest in reversing his conviction is obviously a strong one. 92
Despite the ability to challenge structural provisions because of
the existence of some secondary personal injury, some constitutional
provisions are unlikely to have such secondary effects. Defining gen-
eralized grievances in terms of constitutional governance has the ef-
fect of rendering these constitutional provisions beyond judicial
review. One has difficulty imagining a way to establish a differenti-
ated injury if the President of the United States chooses not to give
her State of the Union address or decides to run for a third tenn. 9 3
Alternatively, Justice Burger has argued that "In a very real sense, the
absence of any particular individual or class to litigate [a claim] gives
support to the argument that the subject matter is committed to the
surveillance of Congress, and ultimately to the political process."' 94
It is unclear how judicial abdication of select constitutional provi-
sions serves the interests of separation of powers. 95 Understood as a
complex game of checks and balances, separation of powers is not fur-
thered when one of the "checkers" skips town. 96 As one commenta-
tor has noted: "Separation of powers notions are defeated if a branch
of government is free to ignore or disobey the laws without the possi-
190. Excluded from this generalization would have to be the establishment clause
which often does not confer an individual right. See Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982).
191. U.S. CONs-r. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
192. See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
193. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 97.
194. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
195. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (citing separation of powers as the
primary rationale for the standing doctrine).
196. See I KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2:5 (1978) (argu-
ing that separation of powers requires a blending of governmental power).
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bility of review."' 97 The delicate balance between coequal branches is
skewed unnecessarily when the judiciary abdicates its constitutional
responsibility.
Furthermore, relying on the representative branches to follow
constitutional mandates is not always practical. Assuming a constitu-
tional violation has occurred, it is unlikely the political process will
rectify the situation, either because the issue at stake seems abstract
(members of Congress serving in the Reserves) or because a majority
of citizens favor the constitutional violation (a popular president run-
ning for a third term). Finally, it has been recognized since 1803 that
"[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department
to say what the law is."'198 Failure to follow this philosophy makes a
leap of faith which obliterates the judiciary's status as a coequal
branch of government. 199
While the constitutional governance cases are relatively clear and
their criticisms are well-entrenched, 0 ° they do not satisfactorily ex-
plain all generalized grievance jurisprudence. As noted earlier, gener-
alized grievances have recently been invoked for the first time in a
statutory case 201 and have also been employed in an equal protection
context to deny standing to individuals claiming infringements under
the Fourteenth Amendment.202 Although constitutional governance
cases go a long way to illustrate generalized grievances, they alone do
not present a complete picture of generalized grievance jurisprudence.
C. Racial Stigmatization as a Generalized Grievance
In a handful of cases beginning with Allen v. Wright203 the
Supreme Court extended generalized grievances beyond the moorings
of "constitutional governance" and into stigmatic injuries associated
197. Treister, supra note 47, at 691.
198. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
199. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 99-105 (1987);
Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976); Martin
H. Redish, Judicial Review and the "Political Question", 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1031 (1985).
But see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THiE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) (argu-
ing that the anti-majoritarian nature of the Supreme Court requires it to avoid deciding
certain constitutional issues); JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITCAL PROCESS (1980) (arguing for the abandonment of judicial review in areas of
separation of powers and federalism.); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960
Term: Forward. The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40, passim (1961) (arguing for
judicial restraint in the Supreme Court).
200. See, e.g., Treister, supra note 47, at 701-06 (arguing that failure to interpret some
constitutional provisions harms rather than furthers separation of powers).
201. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 203-44 and accompanying text.
203. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
1892 [Vol. 74
GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. At
the very least, application of generalized grievances to stigmatic inju-
ries contradicts both large group2°4 and constitutional governance 05
theories of generalized grievances. More importantly, inconsistent ap-
plication of generalized grievance limitations in the equal protection
context draws into question what interests are being served by the
standing doctrine.
In Allen, parents of black school children filed a nationwide class
action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Internal
Revenue Service. 20 6 Arguing that tax exemptions to private discrimi-
natory schools caused cognizable stigmatic injury in and of them-
selves, the parents sought judicial reinterpretation of the provisions.0 7
In one of the Court's most extensive treatments of standing, the Court
failed to reach the merits of the parents' claims.
According to Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, the
plaintiffs had alleged a stigmatic injury "suffered by all members of a
racial group when the Government discriminates on the basis of
race." 208  While there was little question that "this sort of
noneconomic injury [was] one of the most serious consequences of
discriminatory government action, '2 9 it was sufficient to meet stand-
ing requirements only in those cases in which " 'persons.. . are per-
sonally denied equal treatment' by the challenged discriminatory
conduct."21 0 Applying traditional generalized grievance language,"'
and relying at least in part on Schlesinger,212 Levitt,21 3 and Richard-
son,21 4 the Court held that the parents had failed to allege such a per-
sonal and direct racial classification.
21 5
204. See supra notes 155-58 (arguing that large group theories of generalized grievance
cases cannot be rectified with small group equal protection claims).
205. See supra notes 159-202 and accompanying text (outlining the similarity of "consti-
tutional governance" cases).
206. Allen, 468 U.S. at 739.
207. Id. at 744-47.
208. Id. at 754.
209. Id. at 755.
210. Id. at 755 (quoting Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 739-40 (1984)).
211. Id. at 754 ("This Court has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Gov-
ernment act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction
on a federal court.").
212. Allen, 468 U.S. at 754; see supra notes 168-75 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's generalized grievance decision in Schlesinger).
213. Allen, 468 U.S. at 754-55; see supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's holding in Levitt).
214. Allen, 468 U.S. at 754; see supra notes 176-85 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's holding in Richardson).
215. Allen, 468 U.S. at 755.
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The Court gave several justifications for requiring a personal in-
jury to parties alleging stigmatic injury. According to the Court, al-
lowing federal court access whenever plaintiffs alleged a stigmatic
injury would "transform the federal courts into 'no more than a vehi-
cle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystand-
ers.' "216 Since this would infringe on the constitutional spheres of the
representative branches, such a result would violate traditional sepa-
ration of powers principles. 17
Looking only at Allen, without the benefit of future cases, it is
unclear whether the Court meant to analyze the plaintiff's stigmatic
injury as a generalized grievance. Specific reference to generalized
grievances in terms of a stigmatic injury is not found anywhere in the
opinion. In fact, the Court appears to distinguish stigmatic injury
which occurs via government discrimination from "a claim simply to
have the Government avoid the violation of law. ''218 The Court's
traditional generalized grievance language appears only when the
court addresses this latter and broader characterization of the injury.
References to Schlesinger, Richardson, and Ex Parte Levitt occur when
the Court addresses whether the failure to follow the tax provisions is
sufficient to constitute a cognizable injury.1 9 Thus, if stigmatic injury
and injury associated with the government's failure to follow the law
are analytically distinct, racial stigmatization as a generalized griev-
ance was not recognized by the Allen Court.
Whatever the intellectual or precedential foundation for Allen,
recent decisions in the voting rights area suggest that Allen now
squarely implicates generalized grievance jurisprudence. In United
States v. Hays,22 0 the Court confronted an equal protection challenge
216. Ld. at 756 (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Proce-
dures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
217. Id. at 752. The Court went on to argue that recognition of a cognizable injury
suffered by the parents would have severe and irrational effects on the class of plaintiffs
who could sue:
If the abstract stigmatic injury were cognizable, standing would extend nation-
wide to all members of the particular racial groups against which the Government
was alleged to be discriminating by its grant of a tax exemption to a racially dis-
criminatory school, regardless of the location of that school.
Id. at 755-56.
218. Id. at 753 ("Respondents' first claim of injury can be interpreted in two ways. It
might be a claim simply to have the Government avoid the violation of law alleged in
respondents' complaint. Alternatively, it might be a claim of stigmatic injury, or denigra-
tion, suffered by all members of a racial group when the Government discriminates on the
basis of race.").
219. Id. at 754-55.
220. 115 S. Ct. 2431 (1995).
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to Louisiana's legislative apportionment scheme.22 ' The plaintiffs in
Hays argued that Louisiana's allocation of federal legislative seats was
"so irrational on its face that it [could] be understood only as an effort
to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race"
and therefore violated the Equal Protection Clause.222
Holding that the plaintiffs did not have standing, the Court based
its reasoning on the generalized grievance limitation to federal court
access.2" Because the Hays plaintiffs did "not live in the district that
[was] the primary focus of their racial gerrymandering claim, and they
have not otherwise demonstrated that they, personally, have been
subjected to a racial classification, 22 4 the plaintiffs merely alleged a
generalized grievance 25 Thus, the failure to allege a personal racial
classification amounted to a mere attempt to have the government
follow the law. After five years of litigation and substantial resource
expenditures by attorneys on both sides, the case was dismissed.22 6
In denying Louisiana citizens judicial access to challenge the state
redistricting plan, the Court undertook a reanalysis of the Allen deci-
sion. Any doubt that Allen's stigmatic injury was not a generalized
grievance disappeared after the Hays Court's decision:
The rule against generalized grievances applies with as much
force in the equal protection context as in any other. Allen v.
Wright made clear that even if a governmental actor is dis-
criminating on the basis of race, the resulting injury "accords
a basis for standing only to 'those persons who are personally
221. In a ground-breaking decision, the Court in 1993 held that a plaintiff may state a
claim for relief under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if the
state "adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood
only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race."
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832 (1993). Such a showing subjected the congressional
reapportionment plan to strict scrutiny and was unconstitutional absent a showing of a
compelling justification for the scheme narrowly tailored to meet that end. Id. at 2830.
222. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2433 (1995) (citing Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2832
(1995)).
223. Id. at 2436 ("Unless such evidence [of a personal racial classification] is present,
that plaintiff would be asserting a generalized grievance against governmental conduct of
which he or she does not approve.").
224. Id. at 2433.
225. Id. at 2436.
226. Id. at 2437.. In Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995), decided the same day as
Hays, the Court found standing for plaintiffs who challenged a Georgia reapportionment
on the same equal protection grounds. Id. at 2485. The Court's conclusive statement that
standing existed for plaintiffs who lived within the challenged district was the only treat-
ment given to the topic by the majority. Id. The Court went on to hold that the Georgia
plan failed to satisfy a compelling state interest and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at
2494.
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denied equal treatment' by the challenged discriminatory
conduct."' 7
The Hays Court's citation to Richardson and Schlesinger and its
explicit extension of generalized grievance language in an equal pro-
tection context suggests that the Court viewed its standing analysis as
a logical extraction from governmental process injuries.228 In other
words, the Court did not differentiate between Article I injuries, such
as those addressed in Richardson, and equal protection injuries as al-
leged in Hays. Any hope of limiting generalized grievance analysis to
governmental process injuries associated with the structure of a con-
stitutional democracy was destroyed by this extension.
The adoption of generalized grievance limitations in an equal
protection context, however, appears to be limited to circumstances in
which the plaintiff alleges racial stigmatization as the underlying in-
jury. The Hays Court's rejection of standing based on Powers v.
Ohio22 9 illustrates how the Court has failed to apply generalized griev-
ance analysis in other equal protection contexts. In addition, Powers
provides ample proof of the inconsistent application of generalized
grievance limitations.
In Powers the Court found unconstitutional the intentional use of
race-based peremptory strikes2 30 in a jury venire.2 31 Characterizing
any reliance on Powers to establish standing as "unavailing," the Hays
Court attempted to distinguish peremptory cases because they in-
volved the personal classification of individual jurors. 32
Yet the Court's rejection of Powers as sufficiently analogous to
establish standing ignores the basis of standing on which the Powers
Court relied. It was the criminal defendant and not the jury member
227. Hays, 115 S. Ct. at 2435 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,755 (1984)) (inter-
nal citations omitted).
228. See supra notes 159-85 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's generalized
grievance holdings in governmental process cases).
229. 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
230. Peremptory strikes are used in jury trials to exclude members of the jury venire
from sitting on the petit jury. The exclusions may be made without showing cause. Bar-
bara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination In Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It,
Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 725, 726 n.3 (1992).
231. Powers, 499 U.S. at 402. Five years earlier, in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), the Court invalidated intentionally discriminatory peremptory strikes of black ju-
rors as a denial of equal protection. For a discussion of the problem associated with per-
emptory strikes and who should be able to sue, see Underwood, supra note 230, at 750-73.
232. United States v. Hays, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2437 (1995). According to the Court:
"[W]here an individual juror is excluded from a jury because of race, that juror has person-
ally suffered the race-based harm recognized in Powers, and it is the fact of personal injury
that appellees have failed to establish here." Id.
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who sued in Powers.233 Thus, to establish standing, the Court in Pow-
ers was forced to rely upon third party standing principles.
234
Although it was the juror's constitutional rights that were violated, it
was the defendant who sued.
It is important to reemphasize that third party standing requires a
cognizable injury sufficient to satisfy Article III requirements.2 35 To
meet this requirement the Powers Court offered the following
analysis:
The discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by the
prosecution causes a criminal defendant cognizable injury,
and the defendant has a concrete interest in challenging the
practice. This is not because the individual jurors dismissed
by the prosecution may have been predisposed to favor the
defendant; if that were true, the jurors might have been ex-
cused for cause. Rather, it is because racial discrimination in
the selection of the jurors "casts doubt on the integrity of the
judicial process" and places the fairness of a criminal pro-
ceeding in doubt." 6
It is difficult to find a more speculative or generalized injury than
a concern about the "integrity of the judicial process." 7 Yet the
Court held such an injury judicially cognizable in Powers and in later
peremptory challenge cases barring race-based peremptory strikes in
civil cases238 and to exclusions of African-Americans239 and males.240
But who suffers this loss of faith in the integrity of the process in-
quiry? Why would a defendant suffer this loss of faith any more than
a police officer who takes the stand or a homeless woman seeking
shelter from the cold? Each is harmed in some amorphous way by
being part of a process poisoned by stereotype. Each participant is
233. Powers, 499 U.S. at 402.
234. Given the strong motivation associated with gaining a new trial, the Court in Pow-
ers found the defendant's interests sufficiently strong to meet the third party standing re-
quirement of a close relationship. Id. at 414-15. An additional factor was that the excluded
juror was unlikely to bring suit. Because of the small financial stake, the "economic bur-
den of litigation" and the difficulty in knowing why they were excluded, there were "barri-
ers to a suit by an excluded juror" and jurors suffered "some hinderance" in their ability to
protect their interests. Id.
235. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
236. Powers, 499 U.S. at 411 (citations omitted) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545,
556 (1979)).
237. Id.
238. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
239. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992).
240. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994).
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seeking only to have the government follow the law. As such, each
participant alleges a generalized grievance.24'
The Hays Court never explained why race-based peremptory
strikes create a cognizable injury for defendants but race-based redis-
tricting lines do not create a cognizable injury for voters.242 The same
integrity problems result when a state legislature redistricts on racial
grounds as when a prosecutor excludes a juror on racial grounds. In
both instances the government has put the integrity of a vital "incident
of citizenship '2 43 in jeopardy by making stereotypical assumptions
about individuals. In each case the integrity of the system, be it judi-
cial or voting, has been harmed. Yet harm to the system, without
more, is a generalized grievance. Claims based on harm to the sys-
tem's integrity seek to vindicate rights "shared in substantially equal
measure by all or a large class of citizens."'244 The Court's adoption of
a generalized harm in Powers, and its failure to remain true to that
analysis in Hays, does not bode well for a coherent understanding of
generalized grievances.
Despite these criticisms, a generalized grievance analysis appears
implicated when racial stigmatization is the alleged injury. Simply
stated, a party has alleged a generalized grievance when they fail to
allege a personal and direct classification by governmental action. In
the gerrymandering context, direct classification is likely to exist only
if the plaintiff is a member of the district being challenged. Given the
seemingly opposite conclusions in peremptory cases, trying to extend
the Court's generalized grievance analysis beyond the limited confines
of racial stigmatization is probably an unprofitable exercise.
D. Generalized Grievance As a Non-particularized Injury
The Article III requirement of a concrete and particularized in-
jury has been a part of standing analysis since the Court's 1972 deci-
241. See Brian R. Markley, Comment, Constitutional Provisions in Conflict: Article III
Standing and Equal Protection After Shaw v. Reno, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 449, 458 (1995)
(noting that in "both Batson and Powers, the injury suffered by the community at large
resembles the abstract, generalized harm that the Schlesinger Court found insufficient to
satisfy the Article III case or controversy requirement").
242. The similarities of voting and juror service have not gone unnoticed. Vikram David
Amar, Jury Service As Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203,203-
10 (1995); see also Underwood, supra note 230, at 741 n.129 (listing the sources which have
drawn an analogy between jury service and voting).
243. Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 369, 397 (1992) ("[J]ury service is a basic incident of citizenship and a basic
form of participation, nearly on par with voting.").
244. Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989).
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sion in Sierra Club v. Morton.45 From a linguistic point of view, the
opposite of particularized is generalized. It is not a stretch in logic to
assume that generalized grievances are merely labels given to injuries
which do not satisfy the concrete and particularized component of
standing.
This view of generalized grievances is simple and straightforward,
a trait perhaps unfamiliar to standing analysis. It does, however, ex-
plain the Court's reliance on generalized grievances in the Lujan deci-
sion. With the exception of Lujan, generalized grievances have been
implicated at the Supreme Court level only in cases alleging constitu-
tional violations. 46 Lujan was an aberration from past decisions be-
cause it involved a statutory claim.247 Although such a distinction may
not be analytically important, the ramifications of the distinction
should be plain. If generalized grievances were prudential, Congress's
citizen suit provision would be enough to confer standing.
The failure to distinguish constitutional and statutory violations is
justifiable under this theory because Article III applies equally to con-
stitutional and statutory violations. 48 Congress is therefore not af-
forded an opportunity to extend federal court access. Furthermore,
generalized grievance access limitations can easily be extended be-
yond the unique fact patterns associated with constitutional govern-
ance cases. Under this theory, Lujan does not represent a departure
from the past, but merely represents the first statutory claim which did
not meet the Court's requirement of particularity and which the Court
chose to label as a generalized grievance.
It is important to note that describing generalized grievances as
non-particularized Article Ill injuries necessitates the conclusion that
generalized grievance analysis is not a distinct standing requirement.
At most, generalized grievances are a group of cases which do not
meet the particularity requirement. They are descriptive, but that is
all.
This analysis of generalized grievances fits particularly well with
the Court's apparent extension of generalized grievances to the Equal
245. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
246. Recall Richardson and Ex Parte Levitt's reliance on Article I, Hays and Allen's
reliance on the Equal Protection Clause, Schlesinger's separation of powers claim, and
Fairchild's focus on Article VI. In each of these cases the plaintiff alleged an injury under
the Constitution. See supra notes 159-227 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 125-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding in
Lujan).
248. Under Article III, "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Eq-
uity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made ......
U.S. CONSTr. art. III, § 2.
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Protection Clause.249 The Court's holdings in Allen 50 and Hays 251 are
better explained as Article III particularity requirements than as inju-
ries "shared in substantially equal measure with all or a large class of
people." This is true since discrete minority groups rarely constitute a
large class of citizens. Furthermore, it resolves the tension between
"governmental process" injuries, in which the only injury is constitu-
tional impropriety, and stigmatic injuries, which reflect a more per-
sonal injury, but one the Court has nevertheless sought to narrow.
Despite its simplicity, this theory has problems. First and fore-
most, the requirement of particularity initially adopted in Sierra Club
emerged contemporaneously with the development of generalized
grievances as a prudential limitation. The argument that generalized
grievances are part of the particularity requirement is difficult to make
considering that courts have recognized them as analytically distinct
for so long. For example, in Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bell-
wood252 the Court recognized both a prudential limitation against in-
juries "shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
people"'"z 3 and an Article III requirement of a "distinct and palpable
injury.' '- 4 The Court recognized and endorsed particularity and gen-
eralized grievances as distinct concepts in several court opinions lead-
ing up to Luan.255
As noted earlier,256 many commentators view Lujan as a depar-
ture from a prudential understanding of generalized grievances. Yet
lower courts have not appeared to endorse this view.257 This tension
dovetails into the second problem with equating generalized griev-
ances and Article III particularity limitations. Even if the Court has
incorporated generalized grievances within the particularity require-
ment, a residual prudential component to the generalized grievance
concept may still exist. For example, some cases which have a particu-
larized injury may impact so many people that the judiciary feels com-
249. See supra notes 203-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's characteriza-
tion of generalized grievances in the equal protection context).
250. See supra notes 203-19 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's holding in
Allen).
251. See supra notes 220-27 (discussing the Court's holding in Hays).
252. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
253. Id. at 100 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
254. Ia (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 501).
255. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); Secretary of State of Md. v. Joseph H.
Monson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 n.5 (1984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
256. See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
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pelled to defer to the other branches of government.2-5 This would
explain why generalized grievances still garner attention in the lower
courts and why generalized grievances may encompass both an Article
III and a prudential component. To understand how this might have
occurred and why this notion must ultimately be rejected, it is neces-
sary to go on.
E. Generalized Grievances as a Form of Judicial Restraint:
"Questions of Wide Public Significance"
1. The Mischaracterization of Generalized Grievances
The Supreme Court's first attempt to characterize and explain
generalized grievances prudentially came in its 1975 decision Warth v.
Seldin.5 9 Liberal quotation of that decision is necessary to under-
stand the Court's later decisions. According to Justice Powell, writing
for the majority:
Apart from th[e] minimum constitutional mandate, this
Court has recognized other limits on the class of persons who
may invoke the courts' decisional and remedial powers. First,
the Court has held that when the asserted harm is a "genera-
lized grievance" shared in substantially equal measure by all
or a large class of citizens, that harm alone normally does not
warrant exercise of jurisdiction. E.g., Schlesinger v. Reservist
to Stop the War; United States v. Richardson; Ex Parte Levitt.
Second, even when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient
to meet the "case or controversy" requirement, this Court
has held that the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the
legal rights or interests of third parties. Without such limita-
tions-closely related to Art. III concerns but essentially
matters of judicial self-governance-the courts would be
called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public sig-
nificance even though other governmental institutions may
be more competent to address the questions and even
though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect
individual rights.26 °
Close analysis of this important paragraph reveals some ambigui-
ties. First, the Court's reliance on Levitt, Schlesinger, and Richardson
258. For example, commentators have argued that the Supreme Court avoided under-
taking any challenges to the war in Vietnam because of the inability of the judiciary to
adequately address such a broad political, economic, and social issue. BoB WOODWARD &
ScoITr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 125-27 (1979).
259. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
260. Id. at 500.
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is informative. As noted earlier, Levitt was decided well before the
modern concept of standing had developed and before prudential the-
ories limited access to federal courts.261 Similarly, neither Richardson
nor Schlesinger expressly relied on a prudential theory to reach their
holdings. In fact, Schlesinger was clearly rooted in an Article III anal-
ysis. 262 These cases simply do not support the recognition of a pru-
dentially based generalized grievance. The Warth Court took a
constitutionally based limitation and reformulated it into a prudential
one.
The structure of the paragraph also yields confusion. Note that it
is not until after a description of generalized grievances that the Court
discusses the case or controversy requirement.263 Since this case or
controversy language comes after a description of generalized griev-
ances, it would seem to place generalized grievances within an Article
III framework. The language implies that generalized grievances do
not meet the case or controversy requirement.
This would be the end of the inquiry, but later in the same para-
graph the Court refers to both third party standing and generalized
grievances as matters related to, but not directly required by, Article
III. "Without such limitations... the courts would be called upon to
decide abstract questions of wide public significance. '' 264 Notice the
Court's treatment of these limitations in the plural form. Because
only generalized grievances and third party standing are referred to in
the paragraph, it seems the Court viewed them both as prudentially
based. It also means that both third party standing and generalized
grievances were originally justified because of an aversion toward an-
swering "questions of wide public significance."
This misidentification of generalized grievances as prudentially
based was the genesis for the confusion surrounding this area ever
since. In Valley Forge the Court sustained the mischaracterization of
generalized grievances and then added a new layer of confusion to the
analysis. In the Court's opinion, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, identified the now three prudential limitations of stand-
261. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
262. See supra aotes 172-75 and accompanying text; see also TRIBE, supra note 8, at 125
n.7 (noting that the Schlesinger Court rooted its decision in an Article III particularity
requirement, but that the "Supreme Court subsequently indicated that Schlesinger's stand-
ing decision was nonetheless prudential rather than constitutionally mandated").
263. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
264. Id. at 500.
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ing.2 65 Along with limits on third party standing and the requirement
of a zone of interest the Court noted:
[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged redressable injury suffi-
cient to meet the requirements of Art. III, the Court has re-
frained from adjudicating "abstract questions of wide public
significance" which amount to "generalized grievances," per-
vasively shared and most appropriately addressed in the rep-
resentative branches.266
In support of this statement the Court relies on Warth.267 But the
Valley Forge Court's quotations from Warth are taken out of context
and further distort the previous misapplication which occurred in
Warth. Notice that the Court takes what originally was the justifica-
tion for both third party standing and generalized grievances (abstract
questions of wide public significance) and transfers it solely to the
concept of generalized grievances. In doing so, Valley Forge contin-
ued the process of misapplying generalized grievances and distorting
their original meaning. Since Valley Forge, most cases outlining stand-
ing requirements have adhered to a definitional formula which relies
on judicial restraint as the overriding concern associated with genera-
lized grievances. 68
Lujan merely appears to have changed the focus of generalized
grievances.269 The Lujan Court characterized generalized grievances
as an Article III requirement. However, this characterization of gen-
eralized grievances is not something new. It was done in Richardson,
Schlesinger, Fairchild, and arguably Allen v. Wright. Yet because Lu-
jan was the first time since the misapplication in Warth and Valley
Forge, commentators assumed the Court was changing its position.
As this Comment has attempted to demonstrate, generalized griev-
ances, whenever expressly relied upon to deny standing, have been
firmly rooted in Article III requirements of a particularized injury. 7 0
265. Between Warth and Valley Forge, the Court's opinion in Data Processing created
the third prudential limitation known as "zone of interest." See supra notes 104-08 and
accompanying text.
266. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500
(1975)).
267. Id
268. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (describing generalized griev-
ances as claims "more appropriately addressed in the representative branches"); Secretary
of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 955 n.5 (1984) (describing genera-
lized grievances as claims the "courts are neither well equipped nor well advised to
adjudicate").
269. See supra notes 137-49 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 147-254 and accompanying text.
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In fact, the Supreme Court has never denied standing because a party
presented a prudential limitation known as generalized grievances. 271
Thus, for all its criticism in other areas, Justice Scalia's decision in Lu-
jan repaired the damage which began in Warth and has been perpetu-
ated ever since.
2. Political Questions Hidden in Generalized Grievance Clothing
The repair of generalized grievance jurisprudence does not ex-
plain why circuit courts continue to follow a prudentially based form
of generalized grievances. Something more is going on. Subtle differ-
ences arguably exist in recent circuit court standing cases which may
help to explain what underlies these decisions.
For example, in Region 8 Forest Services Timber Purchasers v. Al-
cock272 the Eighth Circuit listed three prudential limitations. Accord-
ing to the court, in addition to third party and zone of interest
limitations, the federal courts are barred from "adjudicat[ing] 'ab-
stract questions of wide public significance.' "273 The court never
mentioned generalized grievances in its analysis. This trend toward
defining the third prudential limitation in terms of "questions of wide
public significance" without referring to generalized grievances has
not been recognized by other courts after Lujan.2 74 Nevertheless,
while circuit courts generally have retained some generalized griev-
ance language, the shift towards defining generalized grievances as
questions of "wide public significance" is profound.2 75
271. Nor has the Supreme Court ever expressly indicated it was rejecting a defendant's
prudentially based generalized grievance argument. See Community Nutrition Inst. v.
Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1251 n.74. (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("It is not clear whether [generalized
grievances] ha[ve] ever been applied as a non-constitutional limit."), rev'd, 467 U.S. 340
(1984).
272. 993 F.2d 800 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub nom Southern Timber Purchasers
Council v. Meier, 114 S. Ct. 683 (1994). At issue in Alcock'was whether timber companies
had standing to challenge the United States Forest Service's policies regarding the protec-
tion of the endangered red-cockaded woodpecker. Id. at 802. The court concluded that
the plaintiffs did not have injuries redressable through court action. Id. at 811.
273. Id. at 805.
274. The failure of some courts to abandon generalized grievance language in terms of
prudential limitations is not surprising. Given the many pitfalls of standing jurisprudence
and the ambiguity surrounding the Court's decision in Lujan, lower courts may have sim-
ply not recognized the reformulation which took place in 1992. It is likely Justice Scalia did
not see the Court making a significant change in the understanding of generalized griev-
ances. Furthermore, many circuit court decisions resemble a cookie cutter analysis of Arti-
cle III and prudential limitations. Since the discussions of prudential limitations are
usually dicta and almost never directly relevant, misapplication is understandable.
275. See Church v. City of Huntsville, 30 F.3d 1332, 1335 (11th Cir. 1994) ("[F]ederal
courts should avoid deciding generalized grievances that present abstract questions.")
(quoting Cone Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1203 n.43 (11th Cir.) (al-
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It is important to distinguish the definitional posture of circuit
court decisions from general rationales behind generalized grievances.
In the past, "questions of wide public significance" have been invoked
to justify standing limitations. 6  As mere justifications, concerns
about the courts' larger impact in a constitutional system is appropri-
ate. Yet, recently, lower courts have defined generalized grievances as
"questions of wide public significance" rather than justified their ap-
plication on that basis. This is significantly more important because it
requires some substantive understanding of what a "question of wide
public significance" is.
But what does this aversion to "abstract questions" refer to? The
D.C. Circuit may have had the answer nearly thirteen years ago:
If a question is abstract, the constitutional limits on standing
require dismissal. If on the other hand, the concern is that
other government institutions are more competent to ad-
dress the question, the political question doctrine, a pruden-
tial consideration,. would appear to require dismissal. 77
An aversion to abstract "questions of wide public significance"
may merely be a reformulation of the political questions doctrine. 278
Unfortunately, the political questions doctrine is in as much a state of
confusion as generalized grievance analysis.2 79 Initially, it should be
noted that political questions and standing are separate justiciability
terations in original), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 942 (1991)); Adams v. Watson, 10 F.3d 915, 918,
n.7 (1st Cir. 1993) ("[C]laimants with 'generalized grievances' shared by a large class of
citizens and raising 'abstract questions of wide public significance' normally will be denied
standing.") (quoting Valley Forge, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982)); Sullivan v. Syracuse Hous.
Auth., 962 F.2d. 1101, 1106 (2nd Cir. 1992) ("[C]ourts generally should refrain from adju-
dicating 'abstract questions of wide public significance.' "); accord, United States v. AVX
Corp., 962 F.2d 108, 114 (1st Cir. 1992); Goos v. ICC, 911 F.2d 1283, 1290 (8th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Kerner, 895 F.2d 1159, 1162 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990).
276. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982).
277. Community Nutrition Inst. v. Block, 698 F.2d 1239, 1252 n.74 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
rev'd, 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
278. As an alternative to "wide public significance" being a reformulation of the polit-
ical questions doctrine, the analysis is arguably not an independent requirement at all but
rather the rationale behind third party standing. As noted supra notes 259-64 and accom-
panying text, the Court in Warth originally applied this "wide public significance" language
to both generalized grievances and third party standing. Assuming generalized grievances
are constitutionally based, questions of wide public significance are being served when the
court refuses to allow claims by third parties whose rights are not implicated. Importantly,
however, "wide public significance" is not what defines third party standing. Instead, it
merely explains and justifies its usage. In this sense it differs from an abstract question
analysis which seeks to gain meaning from issues which are of "wide public significance."
279. See TRIBE, supra note 8, at 96-107.
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questions. Along with mootness280 and ripeness, 281 the concepts of
political questions and standing encompass the larger doctrine of jus-
ticiability.282 Although tangentially related, these justiciability issues
all come together to allow or deny access to federal courts.
In Baker v. Carr2 83 the Court set out to provide an outline of
factors which govern political questions. According to the Court:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a polit-
ical question is found a textually demonstratable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manage-
able standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of decid-
ing without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's un-
dertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of
the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political deci-
sion already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments
on one question.2 4
While it is beyond the scope of this Comment to explore this compli-
cated area of justiciability, it is enough that these factors are reason-
ably related to concerns about "questions of wide public
significance. '285 Given the similarity between political questions and
what is best described as "abstract questions of wide public signifi-
cance," clarity and simplicity dictate abandoning "abstract questions"
as a distinct prudential limitation. Its use has only generated confu-
sion, and it adds little to the analysis not already addressed by the
political questions doctrine.
280. See generally 13A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE.
DURE § 3533.1,218 (1984) ("Mootness decisions are concerned in large part with the deter-
mination whether any effective purposes can still be served.").
281. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 113, § 3532, 112 (1984) ("Ripeness doctrine is
invoked to determine whether a dispute has yet matured to a point that warrants
decision.").
282. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 42 ("[J]usticiability includes the prohibition
against advisory opinions, standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question
doctrine.").
283. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
284. Id. at 217.
285. For a more in depth discussion of political questions, see CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 97, at 142-54; TRIBE, supra note 8, at 96-107; Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Ques-
tions Affect Individual Rights: The Other Nixon v. United States, 1993 Sup. CT. REV. 125;
J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97
(1988); Robert F. Nagel, Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political
Question Doctrine, 56 U. CH. L REV. 643 (1989); Louise Weinberg, Political Questions
and the Guarantee Clause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 887 (1994).
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The abandonment of an "abstract question of wide public signifi-
cance" prudential limitation is not a dramatic move. The Supreme
Court has never applied this "abstract question" limitation in terms of
a prudential limitation, and its failure to do so would recommend the
abandonment of it by lower courts. In fact, it appears that only two
cases in the circuit courts have ever expressly applied a prudentially
based limitation described either as a generalized grievance or an ab-
stract question of wide public significance.286
In Community Nutrition Institute v. Blocky 7' the court rejected
the use of a generalized grievance analysis to deny individual milk
consumers standing. At issue were compensatory payments to produ-
cers by manufacturers of reconstituted milk products.28 8 The plaintiffs
claimed that such actions precluded them from buying milk products
at lower and stable prices.289 The government argued that such con-
sumer injuries are "suffered in some indefinite way in common with
people generally"2 90 and therefore constitute a generalized grievance
prudentially barred from adjudication. In rejecting this argument the
court "refuse[d] to believe that the mere fact that a plaintiff's injury is
shared by many people requires a court to dismiss his complaint.""29
As a matter of public policy, barring these consumers from adjudicat-
ing their claim would effectively destroy the ability of courts to serve
as an avenue of protection for consumer complaints.292
In Apache Bend Apartments v. United States Through IRS,2 93 the
Fifth Circuit took a different view. At issue in Apache Bend was the
constitutionality of the 1986 Tax Reform Act's transition rules 2 94 The
plaintiffs alleged that these rules provided exemptions from desig-
nated provision for a select group of taxpayers and that such exemp-
tions violated the Uniformity Clause and the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment. 95 In a rehearing en banc, the
286. This is not to say that confusion has not or will not arise in the district courts.
287. 698 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 467 U.S. 340 (1984).
288. Id. at 1242.
289. Id. at 1246-47.
290. Id. at 1251 (quoting Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923)).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 1251 (citing Cutler v. Kennedy, 475 F. Supp. 838, 848 n.23 (D.D.C. 1979),
overruled on other grounds by Chaney v. Heckler, 718 F.2d 1174, 1188 (1983)) ("If dismis-
sal were required in such cases, consumer injuries would never be justiciable because
'[clonsumer injuries, by their very nature tend to be shared in common by many other
similarly situated individuals.' ").
293. 987 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
294. Id. at 1175.
295. Id.
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court held that the plaintiffs failed to satisfy a prudentially based ban
against generalized grievances.296
According to the court, the plaintiffs' claim was "shared in sub-
stantially equal measure by a 'disfavored class' that includes all tax-
payers who did not receive transition relief. '297 This was true because
the plaintiffs were not seeking transition relief for themselves, but
were requesting the denial of transition relief to those who were cur-
rently receiving it.298 While recognizing that " 'standing is not to be
denied simply because many people suffer an injury' ,,299 the court
noted that the rationale " 'if [the plaintiffs] have no standing, no one
will have standing to sue' is not a reason to find standing.' "300 As
such, the plaintiffs' "allegations of inequality resulting from the transi-
tion rules present 'abstract questions of wide public significance'
which amount to 'generalized grievances,' pervasively shared and
most appropriately addressed in the representative branches."
'30 1
Apache Bend is a paradigm example of how lower courts may
misinterpret the constitutional foundation of generalized grievances.
Decided in 1993, the court had the benefit of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Lujan and cited to that opinion in the case.30 2 The court
nevertheless applied a prudentially based generalized grievance using
the language of the Court's misquoted opinion in Warth.03 This is not
troublesome because the outcome would have been different.30 4 In-
stead, the real problem is that the court succeeds in distorting genera-
lized grievance by applying political question considerations to a
generalized grievance analysis. Consider this comment by Judge Jolly
of the majority:
Prudential principles are judicial rules of self-restraint,
founded upon the recognition that the political branches of
296. Id. at 1175-76.
297. Id. at 1177-78.
298. Id. at 1178.
299. Id. at 1178 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency
Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973)).
300. Apache Bend Apartments, 987 F.2d at 1179 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974)).
301. Id. at 1180 (quoting Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Sepa-
ration of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982)).
302. Id. at 1176.
303. Id., see supra notes 259-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Warth
misinterpretation).
304. Given the court's liberal citations to Schlesinger, Richardson, Levitt, and Fairchild,
it is likely the court would have reached the same conclusion if it had applied a constitu-




government are generally better suited to resolving disputes
involving matters of broad public significance.
30 5
If generalized grievances exist, and are defined as concepts of
self-restraint concerning questions of wide public significance, then
this is unquestionably an application of the political questions doc-
trine. It is a misnomer to call this analysis a prudential limitation of
standing. The court is essentially developing a new form of political
questions without the benefit of precedent or standards to help guide
its decisions. °6
Note that as outlined in Bakerv. Carr, the Court has articulated a
multi-factor balancing approach to the political questions doctrine. °7
Such a balancing approach has not developed in a prudentially based
generalized grievance case. The absence of an underlying test lends to
unprincipled and subjective applications of the political questions doc-
trine without ever referring to political questions in the court's analy-
sis. The abandonment of a wide public significance test is therefore
useful, sound, and lends itself to clarity. More importantly, it will lead
to more principled and objective decisions in the standing area be-
cause it will remove a form of inquiry which must inherently look at
the merits of the underlying claim.
Consider the Supreme Court's distinction between political ques-
tions and standing in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Or-
ganization.30 8 According to the Court:
Unlike other associated doctrines, for example, that which
restrains federal courts from deciding political questions,
standing "focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint
before a federal court and not on the issues he wishes to
have adjudicated.
'30 9
Yet a prudential limitation concerned with whether questions are
of wide public significance must necessarily look at the underlying
merits.310 Not only must the court look at the merits, but to deter-
mine if it is a question of wide public significance, it must assess the
305. Apache Bend Apts., 987 F.2d at 1176.
306. But see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 97, at 142-43 (arguing that the standards for
determining a political question are unclear and not helpful).
307. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
308. 426 U.S. 26 (1976).
309. Id. at 1937-38 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968)).
310. Unlike prudential limitations on standing, a constitutionally based concept of gen-
eralized grievances will not have to look at the merits and assess the larger impact of a
favorable or unfavorable decision. For a constitutionally based generalized grievance,
rooted in the particularity component, it is enough to look at the alleged injury and deter-
mine if it involves a generalized claim seeking to ensure that the government follow the
law. A prudentially based limitation, rooted in questions of wide public significance, must
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impact of its ruling. To do this the court must consider additional fac-
tors unrelated to a traditional standing inquiry. How a court is to un-
dertake this analysis without considering the underlying issues is
difficult to discern. The court in Block could not evaluate the nature
of the plaintiffs claim without looking beyond the plaintiff to see how
its decision would affect consumers. Nor could the Apache court con-
clude tax exemptions would affect only a small portion of taxpayers
without an analysis of the underlying issues of the plaintiff's com-
plaint. Any focus on the party without looking at the underlying is-
sues would not reveal whether coequal branches of government are
better suited to resolving a particular issue. Since standing focuses on
the party and not the claim,3 1 ' questions of wide public are for all
intents and purposes political questions hiding in a standing frame-
work. The Supreme Court and the lower courts should recognize this
and abandon notions of a prudential limitation based on any form of a
generalized grievance.
V. CONCLUSION
As the jurisdictional doctrine of standing gains more and more
influence in federal courts, a more sound and coherent doctrine must
emerge. Despite attempts to limit public law litigation in federal
courts, challenges against governmental action remain essential to the
continued vitality of the Constitution as a living document. Contra-
dictory and confusing standing doctrines create the appearance of in-
justice and lead to inefficient adjudication of issues. Litigants are left
wondering whether the courts are a last resort or a parody of injustice.
Clarity in the field of generalized grievances would be a signifi-
cant step in the right direction. In an effort to achieve this goal, this
Comment has attempted to outline and explore the concept of genera-
lized grievances. Five theories or fact patterns have been presented
and subjected to critical analysis. The first, injuries suffered by a large
group, adds little to an understanding of generalized grievances. The
second, injuries associated with constitutional governance, while not
without criticism, is a more coherent concept. Its major structural
flaw results from the removal of constitutional provisions from judicial
review. The third, concerning racial stigmatization, is a particularly
inappropriate application of generalized grievances given the Court's
incongruous results in jury cases and the Court's reliance on specula-
do more. It must assess the impact of the claim on others and look at the underlying issues
to discern if it is institutionally competent to address the claim.
311. See supra note 36-37 and accompanying text.
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tive non-imminent injuries. The fourth, associated with the particu-
larity requirement of injury-in-fact, stands on the firmest ground.
Under this approach, however, generalized grievances are merely a
category of abstract injuries which do not satisfy injury-in-fact.
The fifth theory of generalized grievances as a prudentially based
policy of self-restraint should be completely abandoned. A pruden-
tially based generalized grievance has never been applied at the
Supreme Court level. Its creation resulted from unfortunate misappli-
cation by the Court. Further adherence to it in the Court's standing
litany only adds confusion.
At the circuit court level generalized grievances have been per-
verted into a broad-based inquiry into political questions masquerad-
ing as a standing analysis. It is here where the greatest threat to a
coherent standing analysis exists. If lower courts continue to look at
the underlying merits and assess judicial competency, generalized
grievances may eventually broaden the application of political ques-
tions and distort the court's traditional focus on the party and the in-
jury. Explicit language removing generalized grievances from
prudential inquiry is therefore necessary, important, and principled.
The Supreme Court should take this simple step and in the process
begin the journey toward clarifying the beleaguered doctrine of
standing.
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